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Hang by the Neck Until Dead: The Resurgence of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment in the 1990s
Pamela S. Nagy*
I hold that no man can be hanged, because who will assert that to take a
man and drag him up and let him choke to death is not cruel? We all
know that it is cruel. There can be nothing more cruel conceived by the
mind of man. It is torture the most horrible. And yet it is done.,
On January 5, 1993, an atrocious act was committed by the State of
Washington. Westley Allan Dodd, a convicted child killer, was hanged at the
Washington state prison in Walla Walla.2 It was the first hanging in the United
States since 1965. 3 Why such a barbaric method of execution was used in this
modem day when execution by lethal injection prevails is a question that looms
in the minds of many people, legal theorists and lay persons alike.! More
important, however, is the question of whether or not states should still be using
such a method in light of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.5 While Washington was the first state in twenty-eight years
to hang a person, three other states still retain the ability to hang a person when
the death penalty is imposed.'
* B.S., Eastern Michigan University, 1987; J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law,
1990; Graduate Teaching Fellow, Temple University School of Law, 1991-93; LL.M., Temple University
School of Law, 1994.
1. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 642 n.23, 493 P.2d 880, 889 n.23, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 161 n.23
(1972) (relating a statement by a delegate of the California Legislature in opposition to the death penalty in
1879).
2. Coroner Concludes Murderer Felt Little Pain When Hanged, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 1993, at 23
[hereinafter Murderer Felt Little Pain].
3. Id.
4. For statistics on the various methods of execution, see infra notes 251-263 and accompanying text.
5. The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6. The three other states are Delaware, New Hampshire and Montana. It should be noted that a person
is not automatically sentenced to die by hanging in any state. In both Washington and Montana, a person
sentenced to death has a choice between death by hanging and death by lethal injection. See MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-19-103(3) (1993) (permitting a defendant to choose between death by hanging or, in the alternative, lethal
injection, if the defendant makes the choice at the hearing at which an execution date is set; however, if the
defendant for some reason fails to choose lethal injection at that time, then the option to choose lethal injection
is waived); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180(1) (West 1993) (mandating death by hanging unless the
defendant chooses lethal injection); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(0 (1993) (retaining hanging as
an alternative method in the event the preferred method of lethal injection is found unconstitutional); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (XIII, XIV) (Supp. 1993) (leaving defendants in New Hampshire at the mercy of the
commissioner of corrections who may choose hanging if he or she deems that death by lethal injection is
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 26
This Article explores the issue of whether hanging constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In reaching the conclusion that
hanging is cruel and unusual, the author does not intend to suggest that the death
penalty itself is unconstitutional; rather, only that this particular method of
execution needs re-examining. The Article is divided into four sections. Part I
discusses the history and phenomenon of hanging, as well as the executions of
Westley Allan Dodd and Charles Rodman Campbell, the most recent hangings
in the United States.7 Part II reviews the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
and the cases interpreting the Clause.8 Part III considers the treatment of this issue
by state courts.9 Part IV contains the discussion, and it is divided into three sub-
sections. Subsection A provides evidence to support the conclusion that hanging
is cruel and unusual.' 0 Subsection B addresses the evidence in light of the stan-
dards promulgated by the United States Supreme Court for assessing whether
punishments are cruel and unusual." Finally, in Subsection C, reasons for
retaining hanging are analyzed.'"
I. HANGING AS A METHOD OF EXECUTION
Hanging dates back as early as the tenth century, 3 to a time when other
torturous methods of execution, such as burning alive, boiling alive, disem-
bowelling, 4 drawing and quartering, 5 and gibbeting,' 6 were considered the
norm.'7 By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, hanging had replaced most
"impractical").
7. See infra notes 13-73 and accompanying text. Campbell was executed on May 27, 1994, in Walla
Walla, Washington. Gallows Drop Reduced to Avoid Decapitation During Killer's Hanging, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
July 2, 1994, at AS [hereinafter Gallows Drop]; Killer Struggles with Guards Before Hanging, L.A. TIMES,
May 28, 1994, at A19 [hereinafter Killer Struggles].
8. See infra notes 74-127 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 128-200 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 201-270 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 271-277 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 278-322 and accompanying text.
13. JOHN LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4 (1960).
14. This literally means that the person's internal organs were removed. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NMV
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 362 (1990)..
15. This literally means to change one's shape by pulling and stretching, and then to cut into four
pieces. Id. at 381, 964.
16. A gibbet is "an upright post with a projecting arm for hanging the bodies of executed criminals as
a warning" Id. at 516. However, many criminals were hung in chains alive on gibbets and left there until they
died, often after several days. Some of the corpses were even tarred to last longer. ARTHUR KOEsTLER,
REFLECTIONS ON HANGING 8 (1957).
17. LAURENCE, supra note 13, at 6, 9.
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other methods of execution in England. It was, however, considered a more dis-
graceful method of execution than beheading or shooting,'8 the former of which
was often reserved only for important people such as royalty.t9
In early hangings, people were hung from ropes in trees or a crude type of
gallows, and were made to climb to their deaths by means of a ladder.2" Not only
were these hangings public, but they were often considered the social event of the
season.2' As times progressed, executioners became more concerned about how
the person actually died. Thus, the "long drop" was introduced in the eighteenth
century to ensure that death occurred by breakage of the neck rather than by
strangulation, which was a common occurrence prior to this invention?' This
method of hanging used a formula based on the prisoner's weight in order to
determine the height from which the body should be dropped. Prior to this
method, virtually all prisoners were hung from a height of approximately eight
feet.2' It was eventually discovered that without this precise ratio, the possibility
of decapitating as well as strangling the prisoner was all too real.' Additionally,
hangmen learned to place the knot at a precise angle behind the left side of the
prisoner's neck, in order to assure breakage of the neck.26 These methods are still
considered very important today.
18. Id. at41.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 41.
21. In his book, Arthur Koestler states that "hanging days" in eighteenth century England were
considered the equivalent of national holidays. At many public hangings, fights and stampedes were the norm.
For the upper classes, grandstands were erected, and balconies and windows were rented out for people to
watch the hangings, similar to the modem practice of renting balconies to watch a concert or a baseball game.
Further, the Governor of Newgate Prison frequently entertained certain onlookers with breakfast after a
hanging. See KOESTLER, supra note 16, at 8-10.
22. LAURENCE, supra note 13, at 44.48; NEGLEY K. TEETERS, "...HANG BY THE NECK..." THE LEGAL
USE OF SCAFFOLD AND NOOSE, GIBBET, STAKE, AND FIRING SQUAD FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
156 (1967). Koestler notes that before the introduction of the long drop and placing the knot under the left jaw,
"the agony of slow suffocation without loss of consciousness could last up to twenty minutes." KOESTLER,
supra note 16, at 139-40.
23. TEETERS, supra note 22, at 157. Under the Army's current manual, "drop is defined as the distance
from the execution rope knot origin toward the execution area floor base." Jimmy Breslin, Weighty Problem
of Decapitation, NEWSDAY, May 19, 1994, at A02 (quoting Army manual 633-15). The smaller the prisoner,
the farther the prisoner must drop in order to avoid problems. For instance, a prisoner weighing 120 pounds
requires a drop of eight feet, one inch; 150 pounds requires six feet, seven inches; 170 pounds requires six feet,
two inches; and 220 pounds requires five feet, four inches. Id.
24. LAURENCE, supra note 13, at 48.
25. TEErERS, supra note 22, at 158.
26. According to a discussion by a former hangman before the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment in 1950, if the knot is placed behind the right side of the neck, the knot stays behind the prisoner's
neck and throws the neck forward, causing the prisoner to strangle. If the knot is placed behind the left side
of the neck, it causes the prisoner's chin to fall back because the knot ends up under it, breaking the prisoner's
neck. Id. at 156-57; see also Bernard J. Ficarra, Death by Hanging, in LEGAL MEDICINE 1987 at 44,47 (Cyril
H. Vecht, M.D., J.D., ed., 1988) (quoting executioner Albert Pierrepoint).
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In time, people began to speak out against public hangings. 27 However, states
did not begin prohibiting public hangings until 1834, when Pennsylvania became
the first state to do so.' Not only did these new laws prohibit public hangings,
they mandated that hangings be conducted in the state prisons or county jails.?
Moreover, these new laws provided that a physician must be present at the
hanging, and that other witnesses chosen by the sheriff, and in some instances
witnesses chosen by the prisoner, could attend.3' Finally, the prisoner could also
choose to have a particular minister observe the hanging. 31 In many cases, there
was still a large turnout for the hanging. People would crowd inside the jail to
watch the hanging or, if it was conducted within the prison yard, people would
watch from rooftops outside the prison walls.32
In the early 1900s, hanging began to lose its popularity as the preferred
method of execution. This was due in part to the introduction of the electric chair,
which was considered a much faster and less painful method of execution than
hanging.3 New York was the first state to adopt electrocution as its mode of
execution in 1888, and the first electrocution occurred in Auburn Prison in New
York in 1890.' In time, the majority of states eliminated hanging from their death
penalty statutes and replaced it with death by electrocution?5
A. Westley Allan Dodd: A Modern Day Hanging
On January 5, 1993, history was made when Westley Allan Dodd became the
first person in twenty-eight years to be hanged in the United States.36 For Dodd,
who had the choice between hanging or lethal injection pursuant to the
27. Teeters describes the movement to abolish publichangings as originating from the movement to
abolish capital punishment altogether. Dr. Benjamin Rush and William Bradford were two persons who voiced
strong opposition to capital punishment. Rush, a renowned Philadelphia physician and one of the signers of
the Declaration of Independence, gave a speech in 1787 at Benjamin Franklin's home denouncing all forms
of public punishment, and later in 1792 wrote a pamphlet opposing capital punishment. TEEmRs, supra note
22, at 152. Bradford, who was the attorney general of "the Quaker state," wrote in 1788 in favor of abolishing
capital punishment. Id.
28. Id. at 152.
29. Id. at 153.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. For instance, at a hanging conducted in 1909 at Emporium, the county seat of Cameron County,
Pennsylvania, people crowded outside the courthouse where the hanging occurred. Even though officials
placed canvas from the jail to the lawn of the courthouse grounds in order to obstruct the view, people were
still able to see from the sides that were not covered. Id.
33. Lonny J. Hoffman, The Madness of the Method: The Use of Electrocution and the Death Penalty,
70 TEx. L. REv. 1039, 1039 (1992).
34. Id.
35. The following states quickly adopted electrocution soon after New York: Ohio in 1896;
Massachusetts in 1898; New Jersey in 1907; Virginia in 1908; North Carolina in 1909; Kentucky in 1910; and
Arkansas, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Nebraska in 1913. Id.
36. Hanging: A Matter of Choice, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1993, at 25 [hereinafterA Matter of Choice].
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Washington death penalty statute,37 hanging was the clear choice. Dodd, 31, a
confessed child molester and murderer, chose hanging because he raped and
tortured three young boys, and then hanged one of them in 1989.38
Although Dodd's case sparked an intense debate over whether hanging is
cruel and unusual punishment,39 the hanging in Walla Walla, Washington pro-
ceeded without incident.4' Shortly before Dodd was scheduled to hang, a team of
prison workers put the hood, ankle strap and noose on him.4' At 12:09 a.m.
Pacific time, an official at the Washington State Penitentiary pressed a red
button.42 The button triggered the trap door in the gallows to open, causing Dodd,
who was attached to the gallows by a thirty-foot-long rope, to hang.43 Only
sixteen spectators were present to witness the event, including twelve reporters
and two relatives of Dodd's victims.44 None of the witnesses reported that Dodd
"writhed" or "twitched," although some reported seeing some body "movements"
or "flexing."'45 None of the witnesses could see Dodd's face, which was covered
by a hood.46
Obviously, Dodd's case was controversial because he was the first person to
be hanged since 1965.4' One question was whether he actually suffered any pain
during the execution. Central to this issue was the coroner's report. Dr. Donald
Reay, King County Medical Examiner, stated at a news conference that although
Dodd actually died within two to three minutes of the hanging, he did not die
37. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180(1) (West 1990). Hanging was the sole method of
execution for first degree murder until 1981, when lawmakers added the choice of lethal injection. Sally
Macdonald, Death Watch at Walla Walla-Hanging, Once Quite Common, Is Now Rare, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan.
4, 1993, at Al.
38. Lynne Duke, A Hanging Fires Debate over Cruelty: Child Killer Dies on Prison Gallows, WASH.
POST, Jan. 6, 1993, at A3; A Matter of Choice, supra note 36, at 25. Dodd pleaded guilty to killing William
and Cole Neer, ages 10 and 11, from Vancouver, Washington, and Lee Iseli, age 4, from Portland, Washington.
Macdonald, supra note 37, at Al.
39. Not only did the American Civil Liberties Union file suit in Washington to prevent Dodd's hanging,
Dodd's case sparked debate over the entire death penalty issue. Duke, supra note 38, at A3. The media focused
on Dodd's case. For instance, "television reports walked viewers through the process, dramatically
broadcasting the thunk of the trap door and the silence that follows" A Matter of Choice, supra note 36, at 25.
Likewise, newspaper reports also described hanging to the smallest detail, including the type of rope to be used
and the need to wax the rope so that it easily tightens around the prisoner's neck. Id.
40. A Matter of Choice, supra note 36, at 25.
41. Jack Broom, Gallows Gear Shown at Campbell Hearing, SEA'rLE TIMES, May 25, 1993, at B1
[hereinafter Gallows Gear].
42. Brian Christie, Is Execution by Hanging Cruel antd Unusual Punishment?, CNN, Jan. 5, 1993 (live
report- transcript #166) (available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Duke, supra note 38, at A3; Peter Lewis, et al., Doctor Says Dodd Felt No Pain -Neck
Ligaments Tore, Then He Strangled, SEATrLETiMES, Jan. 6, 1993, at Cl.
46. See Duke, supra note 38, at A3; Lewis, supra note 45, at Cl.
47. Murderer Felt Little Pain, supra note 2, at 23.
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from the "classic hangman's fracture."'48 In other words, Dodd's neck was not
broken from the hanging; rather, Dr. Reay opined that Dodd probably died from
a combination of strangulation and neck damage.49 He concluded that Dodd's
neck ligaments tore first, which separated the bones in his spinal column, all of
which rendered him unconscious before he hit the end of the rope.50 He further
opined that any pain Dodd felt was probably brief.5t
While opponents of the death penalty voiced strong opposition prior to
Dodd's hanging, the Washington State Supreme Court declined to stay the
execution, despite an American Civil Liberties Union brief filed by a group of
twenty-six citizens including two retired judges and four state legislators. 2
Another person also voiced opposition to Dodd's hanging-convicted killer
Charles Rodman Campbell.
B. Charles Rodman Campbell
On November 26, 1982, Campbell was convicted on three counts of
aggravated first degree murder for the deaths of Renae Wicklund, age 31, her
daughter Shannon, age 8, and their next door neighbor, Barbara Hendrickson, age
5l." This was not the first time the three victims had encountered Campbell.
Campbell had previously raped and sodomized Renae Wicklund in 1974 while
threatening to kill Shannon, who was one year old at the time, by holding a knife
to Shannon's throat.' Neighbor Hendrickson came to Wicklund's aid after the
rape.55 At the trial, both Wicklund and Hendrickson testified against Campbell,
who was convicted of first degree assault and sodomy.56
In March, 1982, Campbell was transferred from prison to a work release
facility.57 Less than one month later, while on work release, Campbell revisited
Wicklund's home. There he beat her, strangled her, and eventually cut her throat
48. Id. Where "'fracture dislocation of the second and third cervical vertebrae with severed spinal
column"' occurs which results in instantaneous death, there has been a classic hangman's fracture. Ficarra,
supra note 26, at 46-47 (quoting executioner Albert Pierrepoint). According to Jeffrey Cohen, a party working
for the ACLU which attempted to prevent Dodd's execution, the lack of a hangman's fracture showed that
hanging was unpredictable. Kate Shatzkin, et al., Dodd Autopsy Fuels Both Sides of Debate Over Hanging,
SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at GI.
49. Murderer Felt Little Pain, supra note 2, at 23.
50. Shatzkin, supra note 48, at Gl; Lewis, supra note 37, at Cl.
51. Murderer Felt Little Pain, supra note 2, at 23.
52. See Duke, supra note 38, at A3; First Manl Sitce '65 Hanged in U.S., WORLD NEVs DIGEST, Jan.
14, 1993, at 20 G2 (available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File).
53. Richard Barbieri. Judge May Reopen Challenge to Washington Death Penalty, THE RECORDER, Jan.
21, 1993, at 4; Don Hannula, Killer Campbell: A Decade Is Not a Fast Track, SEATrLETIMES, June 3, 1993,
at A12.
54. See Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1987); Hannula, supra note 53, at A12.
55. Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d at 1456.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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with a knife.58 He also cut the throats of Shannon and Hendrickson, who, coin-
cidentally, happened to be visiting Wicklund that day.59 All three of the victims
bled to death.'




61. A partial recitation of the history of Campbell's case is warranted at this juncture. For a discussion
of the procedural history leading to Campbell's conviction, see Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1502, 1504-05
(9th Cir. 1992). Campbell's conviction was affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court in 1984. State v.
Campbell, 691 P.2d 929,948 (Wash. 1984). He then obtained a stay of execution, which had been scheduled
for March 29, 1985, pending action by the U.S. Supreme Court on his petition for certiorari. Hannula, supra
note 53, at A12. The petition for certiorari was denied. Campbell v. Washington, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).
Campbell's second date of execution was scheduled for July 25, 1985. Two weeks before the date
of execution, Campbell filed a stay of execution with the Washington Supreme Court, which rejected the stay
on July 18, 1985. He then filed a habeas corpus petition and a stay of execution in the federal district court,
the latter of which was granted by the court. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the habeas corpus
petition, which was denied on February 12, 1986. This denial was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1467 (9th Cir. 1987).
After another petition for certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court, Campbell v. Kincheloe,
488 U.S. 948 (1988), the third date for execution was set for March 30. 1989, five years after the first execution
date. After denials of stays by the Washington Supreme Court and the federal district court, the Ninth Circuit
granted a stay pending appeal of a denial of a second habeas corpus petition by Campbell. Campbell then filed
a personal restraint against the Washington Supreme Court and raised various issues regarding the death
sentence. While this action was pending in the state supreme court, the Ninth Circuit decided the appeal of the
second habeas corpus petition.
Regarding the constitutionality of the Washington death penalty statute, Campbell made two claims.
First, he argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it was cruel and unusual punishment to make a
person choose between hanging or lethal injection as a method of execution. Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d
1502, 1517 (9th Cir. 1992). In other words, forcing a person "to aide [sic] in the method of his own demise by
electing death by intravenous injection, the less frightening method, to escape death by hanging" was cruel and
unusual. Id.
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that Campbell presented no support for this
argument other than the fact that he feared hanging because it might result in suffocation and strangling. Id.
Additionally, the court ruled that "logic dictates against Campbell's position because any person would
naturally fear their own execution." Id. The fact that people sentenced to die in Washington had a choice of
methods, however, was considered a more humane approach because they had the opportunity to "avoid or
lessen [their] particular fear." Id.
Campbell also argued that hanging was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment
and further, that the Eighth Amendment was violated because Washington did not have a qualified hangman.
The court rejected this argument without reaching the merits of it, on the basis that there was no real case or
controversy at issue. Since Campbell had the opportunity to avoid hanging by choosing lethal injection, his
claim was non-justiciable. As such, any denial by the district court of an evidentiary hearing regarding the
hanging issue was not in error. Id. at 1518. The court also noted in a footnote that Campbell's argument that
the statute violated equal protection was inaccurate, because all capital prisoners in Washington were treated
equally. Id. at 1518 n.9. Thus, it did not matter that Washington was one of the few states to subject its
prisoners to this method of execution, because only the laws of Washington were being applied to Campbell
in this case. Id.
A majority of the Ninth Circuit judges then voted that this case be reheard by the en banc court.
Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1992). The government appealed and the Ninth Circuit denied
its appeal in Campbell v. Blodgett, 992 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1993). The court, however, ordered a remand in
order for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether hanging was cruel and unusual
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1992, Campbell argued that hanging was cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment. A three-judge Ninth Circuit panel rejected Campbell's claim, stating
that he had no standing to challenge hanging because he had a choice between
hanging and lethal injection under the Washington death penalty statute.62 The
same judges ruled that it was not error for the district court to deny Campbell's
request for an evidentiary hearing on this subject since an evidentiary hearing was
not necessary in light of the fact that Campbell's claim was non-justiciable.6a Six
months later, however, the court had a change of heart, and a majority of the
Ninth Circuit voted that this case be heard by the en banc court.
64
The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court for an
evidentiary hearing on whether hanging is cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment, although it retained jurisdiction over the matter. In so
doing, the circuit court did not indicate that the previous evidentiary hearings held
by the district court were inadequate, or that it would be error to deny Campbell
a hearing altogether. U.S. District Judge John C. Coughenour conducted hearings
over four days and ultimately concluded that hanging did not "involve torture,
lingering death, mutilation, or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," and
punishment. The government then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, asking it to vacate the Ninth Circuit's
order for a remand to conduct an evidentiary hearing. In denying the government's application to vacate,
Justice O'Connor wrote, "Although I am concerned about the glacial progress in this case, I have grave doubts
about my authority to offer such relief by way of application." Blodgett v. Campbell, 113 S. Ct. 1965, 1966
(1993). Since she could find no authority which would permit her to grant the application, it was dismissed
without prejudice. Id.
In June 1993, U.S. District Judge John Coughenour conducted the evidentiary hearing and stated
that "hanging does not involve torture, lingering death, mutilation or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain." Is Hanging Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, SEATFLETIMES, June 10, 1993, at Al. In an unpublished
opinion, the court held that hanging was not cruel and unusual punishment, and directed the case back to the
Ninth Circuit for further proceedings. See infra notes 65, 300-314 and accompanying text (discussing Judge
Coughenour's findings). The. Ninth Circuit recently affirmed Judge Coughenour's conclusions. Campbell v.
Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994). After the Ninth Circuit denied Campbell's petition for rehearing and
request for a stay of mandate, Campbell v. Wood, 20 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994), the Supreme Court denied
Campbell's petition for certiorari, Campbell v. Wood, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
Meanwhile, the district court also denied Campbell's third habeas corpus petition, Campbell v.
Blodgett, No. C91-1420C (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 1992), which was affirmed in Campbell v. Blodgett, 997 F.2d
512,525 (9th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court denied Campbell's petition for certiorari with regard to this action
in Campbell v. Wood, 114 S. Ct. 1337 (1994).
On May 27, 1994, Campbell was executed. Gallows Drop, supra note 7, at A8.
62. Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1502, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992). The court declined to consider Camp-
bell's argument by reasoning that he had brought this situation on himself. "Campbell has within his power
the ability to avoid hanging and put an end to his fear. By exercising his right to choose lethal injection,
Campbell has a means to moot his constitutional objection. Thus, his failure to take advantage of the oppor-
tunity to avoid hanging essentially fabricates a case or controversy. This court may not decide a question that,
but for Campbell's choice, would not have arisen." Id. at 1518; see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180 (West
1990) (allowing a defendant to choose between hanging by the neck and lethal injection).
63. Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d at 1518-19.
64. Id. at 1519.
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was therefore constitutional. 65 The findings of fact were reviewed by the Ninth
Circuit, which affirmed Judge Coughenour's decision in February 1994.
6
After twelve years of fighting his conviction, and twenty years after his initial
encounter with the Wicklunds, Campbell was executed on May 27, 1994-one
day after the Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari.67 He did not hang
willingly, however. Prison authorities reported that they had to subdue Campbell
with pepper spray, strap him to a board, and carry him to the gallows because he
refused to cooperate prior to his hanging.' The authorities also found homemade
weapons in Campbell's cell, including one piece of metal that had been sharpened
into a blade.69
Although Campbell's fight is over, the implications of both his and Dodd's
hangings remain. With two hangings in two years, it seems likely that
Washington will continue to utilize hanging as its primary method of capital
punishment, especially since the Supreme Court declined to review the
constitutionality of hanging.70 This also means that Montana, which has a death
penalty statute nearly identical to that of Washington,7t could also hang people
in the near future. However, there are even greater consequences that flow from
the hangings in Washington. While the Ninth Circuit found hanging to be
constitutional, a U.S. District judge for the Northern District of California
recently declared California's use of lethal gas to be unconstitutional.7 Whether
this will survive scrutiny by the Ninth Circuit, in light of its decision to uphold
hanging, remains to be seen. Finally, there appears to be one situation where
hanging cannot be constitutionally conducted in Washington. U.S. District Judge
65. Campbell v. Blodgett, No. C89-456C, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 1993) (copy on file with
the Pacific Law Journal) (setting forth unpublished findings of fact and conclusions of law of U.S. District
Judge John C. Coughenour).
66. See infra notes 298-322 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's decision).
67. Gallows Drop, supra note 7, at A8; Killer Struggles, supra note 7, at A19; The Supreme Court
denied Campbell's petition for certiorari on May 26, 1994. Campbell v. Wood, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
68. Jack Broom & Anthony Lin, Attorney Glad He Didn't Know Campbell Had Anti-Depressant,
SEATLETIMES, June 16, 1994, at BI; Killer Stniggles, supra note 7, at A19.
69. Killer Struggles, supra note 7, at AI9.
70. Washington State Attorney General Christine Gregoire has recently proposed that Washington adopt
lethal injection as its primary method of capital punishment and allow prisoners the option of hanging. A Very
Sensible Solution in Debate over Hanging, SEATrLE TImEs, July 19, 1994, at B4 [hereinafter Sensible
Solution]. Even if this proposal is adopted into law, however it is unlikely that it would end the current debate
in Washington, especially since people sentenced to die by hanging would most likely appeal the consti-
tutionality of the new law. See id.
71. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(3) (1993). Under both statutes, the primary method of
execution is death by hanging unless the defendant specifically chooses death by lethal injection. See supra
note 6 (describing the death penalty statutes of Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire and Washington).
72. Fierro v. Gomez, No. C92-1482 MHP, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14304 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 1994). This
case was filed by the ACLU against the California Department of Corrections on behalf of 375 condemned
inmates on San Quentin's death row. Jim Doyle, Gas Chamber Death is Painless, State Expert Says at ACLU
Trial, S.F. CtRON., Oct. 28, 1993, at A8; Seth Rosenfeld, Gas Chamber Ban Gets Boost at State Hearing, S.F.
EXAM., Nov. 6, 1993, at A10.
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Thomas S. Zilly recently granted inmate Mitchell Edward Rupe's petition for
habeas corpus, finding a likelihood of decapitation should the state actually hang
Rupe, who weighs 409 pounds. 73 Whatever the final outcome of these cases,
however, it seems clear that hanging will remain an issue for debate for quite
some time.
II. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CASES
In order to determine whether hanging is cruel and unusual punishment, one
needs to understand the Eighth Amendment and how the Supreme Court has
interpreted its meaning. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and its
meaning, have been a subject of debate in the past, particularly as to what the
Framers intended when they adopted this language verbatim from the English Bill
of Rights, which first included this language in 1689.' 4 In part, the debate exists
because there is no explanation or reason given for the Clause in the
Constitution.7 5 However, it has generally been determined that the Clause was
adopted in order to prevent the types of cruel punishments that occurred when the
Stuart monarchs reigned over England. 76
Before examining the Supreme Court cases that discuss the Clause, there are
two points worth mentioning. First, the Supreme Court has never considered the
issue of cruelty associated with any particular method of execution, including
73. Rupe v. Wood, No. C91-1635Z, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13543 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 1994)
(holding hanging under Rupe's particular circumstances to be unconstitutional). Part of the problem is that
Washington's hanging protocol, which relies on United States Army Manual 633-15, lists of a chart for weights
of 220 pounds or less. The chart directs that people over 220 pounds are to be dropped from a distance of five
feet. See Jimmy Breslin, Weighty Problem of Decapitation, NEWSDAY, May 19, 1984, at A02; Gallows Drop,
supra note 7, at A8. Incidentally, Charles Campbell weighed 220 pounds at the time of his hanging, and
according to Rupe's attorney Kathryn Ross, Campbell suffered extreme neck damage and was nearly
decapitated during his execution. Id. at AS.
74. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57
CAL. L. REv. 839, 839 (1969); see Allyn G. Heald, United States v. Gonzalez: In Search ofa Meaningful
Proportionality Principle, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 455, 460 n.13 (1992) (stating that there is a lively and
inconclusive debate over the origins and meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); see also
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2687-91 (1991) (discussing the history of the English Declaration of
Rights and the possible origination of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
75. The Eighth Amendment states in its entirety: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
76. See infra note 103. In Weens v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Supreme Court noted that
some commentators suggested the Clause originated because of the atrocities the Stuart monarchs inflicted on
their subjects. Id. at 371-73 (citing Story, Patrick Henry in the Virginia Convention, and Mr. Wilson in the
Pennsylvania Convention as authorities on the Constitution); see also Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 681
(9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the proscription of cruel and unusual punishment has been attributed to barbaric,
torturous punishments imposed by the Stuarts); Heald, supra note 74, at 461 n.19 (stating that the Eighth
Amendment "was thought to be a safeguard against [various] heinous acts" committed by the English); cf.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,266 (1972) (noting that the Clause was not limited to prohibiting the types
of punishments that were inflicted by the Stuarts).
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hanging."7 Second, the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states until the
Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. California in 1962.' As the following
discussion will show, the Court has frequently discussed punishment in terms of
the Eighth Amendment, even though none of the cases raised the precise issue of
whether a particular method of execution was constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. As such, the Court's references to the Eighth Amendment are
merely dicta. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the concepts embodied in these
cases formulated today's standard for defining cruel and unusual punishments. 9
In the Supreme Court's early discussions of the Clause, it used an "historical
interpretation" 8 in order to find punishment constitutional under the Clause. This
mode of analysis defined cruel and unusual punishment by referring to punish-
ments of past ages and comparing them with the punishment at issue before the
Court. Naturally, this historical analysis contains an inherent flaw. Under any sort
of comparison with punishments such as whipping, beheading, disembowelling,
etc., modem punishment is bound to pale in comparison and thus would be con-
sidered constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
The first known case dealing with a challenge regarding a method of
execution is Wilkerson v. Utah.8 This case is also an example of the Court's use
of historical interpretation. In this case, Wilkerson had been convicted of first
degree murder in the Territory of Utah and was sentenced to public execution by
shooting.82 Wilkerson appealed the judge's sentence of public shooting because
the statute in effect at that time only stated that any person convicted of first
degree murder "shall suffer death."83 Thus, the only issue was whether the judge
had exceeded his authority by imposing the manner of execution.!
4
The Court, in holding that the judge had not committed error in choosing
death by shooting, looked to the Territory's previous legislation which provided
that a person convicted of a capital offense would be executed either by shooting,
hanging, or beheading as the court directed, or as the offender chose.8 Upon
77. Martin R. Gardner, Evecutions and hudignities-An Eighth Amendment Assessment of Methods of
Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 Olno ST. L.J. 96, 97, 102-03 (1978); Michael H. Marcus & David J.
Weissbrodt, Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CAL. L. REv. 1270, 1334 (1968).
78. See Marcus, supra note 77, at 1327 n.515 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
79. For other articles discussing the evolution of the Clause and the values it was intended to protect,
see Stephen A. Blum, Public Evecutions: Understanding the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413,437-54 (Winter 1992); Gardner, supra note 77, at 99-109; Marcus, supra note 77,
at 1326-43; Note, Mental Suffering Under Sentence of Death: A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 57 IOWA L.
REV. 814, 821-26 (1972) [hereinafter Mental Suffering].
80. For other references to cases which relied on this type of analysis, see Gardner, supra note 77, at
100; Marcus, supra note 77, at 1328-37. See also Furman v. Georgia, 404 U.S. 238, 263-69 (1972) (discussing
the Court's early decisions which relied upon an historical analysis).
81. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
82. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 131.
83. Id.
84. Gardner, supra note 77, at 99.
85. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 132.
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interpreting the current statute, the Court held that the judge had the power to
prescribe the method of death, since the current statute was silent on that issue.
The Court then remarked that this power was, of course, subject to the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. In dictum, the Court
referred to other past methods of execution which constituted torture, and which
would be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. These included dragging the
prisoner to the place of execution, disembowelling while alive, beheading and
quartering, dissecting the prisoner in public, and burning alive. Thus, even
though the constitutionality of shooting was not at issue, the Court tacitly
conducted an historical interpretation, thereby deeming shooting to be
constitutional.'
The next case to discuss the Eighth Amendment was In re Kemmler,"8 where
the Supreme Court was to determine whether the infliction of death by
electrocution as imposed by the New York Legislature was constitutional. In this
case, the Court expressly held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the
states, nor could it be applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 As such,
the only constitutional issue before the Court was whether the state had acted
arbitrarily or applied the law unequally in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
The Court first noted that in choosing electrocution as the state's method of
execution, the Legislature had done so as a response to the Governor of New
York, who stated in his annual message, "The present mode of executing
criminals by hanging has come down to us from the dark ages, and it may well
be questioned whether the science of the present day cannot provide a means for
taking the life of such as are condemned to die in a less barbarous manner."91 In
defining what constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the Court again reverted
to its historical interpretation and stated:
[I]f the punishment prescribed for an offense against the laws of the state
were manifestly cruel and unusual, such as burning at the stake,
crucifixion, breaking on the wheel or the like, it would be the duty of the
court to adjudge such penalties to be within the constitutional
prohibition.'
86. Id. at 135.
87. Gardner, supra note 77, at 100.
88. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
89. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 445-49. This was the first decision by the Court to hold that the Eighth
Amendment did not apply to the states. Gardner, supra note 77, at 100 n.31 (citing Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan
M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1784 n.51 (1970)).
90. Gardner, supra note 77. at 100.
91. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 444.
92. Id. at 446.
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The Court continued:
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but
the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life?3
Thus, the Court held that death by electrocution was not unconstitutional because,
although at the time electrocution may have been unusual, it certainly was not
cruel according to the standard stated above.
Interestingly, one commentator has suggested that Kemmler could be
interpreted as implying that death by hanging was unconstitutionally cruel, given
that the Court quoted the Governor of New York and expressly upheld the New
York Legislature's decision to utilize electrocution. 4 While such an interpretation
is attractive, it is doubtful that the Court intended to imply anything about
hanging, other than to show that New York was concerned about humanity in its
decision to employ electrocution. Moreover, since hanging was not an issue
before the Court, any attempts to find such an interpretation are tenuous at best.
The year 1910 marked a turning point for the Court with its decision of
Weems v. United States.9 5 First, the Court no longer relied on its historical
interpretation to define cruel and unusual punishments. 6 Second, the Court began
to utilize various concepts other than "torture and lingering death" when
interpreting the Clause. Beginning with Weems and continuing forward with other
cases, the Court's concept of cruel and unusual punishment developed into a
framework consisting of approximately four different factors.?7 First, cruel and
unusual punishment is defined by the contemporary norms and standards of
society. As part of this determination, courts consider the prevalence (or lack
thereof) of a certain punishment in other states or areas. Second, courts
contemplate the prisoner's dignity, as well as the dignity of society. Third, courts
measure whether a punishment is unnecessarily cruel in terms of physical pain.
Fourth, courts also examine the potential for unnecessary psychological pain. It
must be noted that none of these factors alone embody the concept of cruel and
unusual punishment. Rather, it is the sum of all these parts which make up this
nebulous concept.
93. Id. at 447.
94. Death Cases, supra note 77, at 1328-29.
95. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
96. Gardner, supra note 77, at 103; Marcus sutpra note 77, at 1331-32; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238,263-67.
97. For another discussion of the factors that embody the Clause, see Furman, 408 U.S. at 269-81
(setting forth the principles to be applied when determining whether a particular punishment is "cruel and
unusual," which include: human dignity, a punishment proportionate to the crime, contemporary norms of
society, and a prohibition against arbitrary infliction of punishment).
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In Weems, the defendant, a government official in the Philippines, had been
convicted of falsifying an official public document. Weems falsified the
document to show that he had paid employees, when in reality he had not. After
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirmed his sentence, Weems sought
review of his sentence, alleging, in part, that the punishment of fifteen years'
imprisonment constituted cruel and unusual punishment.9 8
In an eloquent opinion written by Justice McKenna, the Court first looked at
the minimum sentence that could have been imposed on Weems. For simply
"perverting the truth" on a single item in a public record, the minimum sentence
was twelve years and one day of imprisonment. 9 This sentence included not only
imprisonment, but "a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful
labor, no assistance from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights
or rights of property, no participation even in the family council."1'° Additionally,
even when
[H]is prison bars and chains are removed.., he goes from them to a
perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is forever kept under the shadow
of his crime, forever kept within voice and view of the criminal
magistrate, not being able to change his domicil[e] without giving notice
to the "authority immediately in charge of his surveillance," and without
permission in writing.'"'
The Court then examined other cases and writings of commentators to
determine what the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" meant. It noted that
before the phrase was adopted, the language of the Clause received some
opposition in Congress, although generally there was very little debate on the
subject. t°2 The Court concluded that the Clause was adopted in part to prevent the
98. Since the Eighth Amendment did not yet apply to the states or other territories of the United States
at the time he was prosecuted, Weems argued that the sentence was unconstitutional in light of the Bill of
Rights adopted by the Philippine Islands, which contained the exact language from the Eighth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367.
99. Id. at 365-66.
100. Id
101. Id.
102. One of the oft-quoted opponents of the Clause was Mr. Livermore, who stated:
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no
objection to it; but, as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary.
What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What is
understood by excessive fines? It lays with the court to determine. No cruel and unusual
punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often
deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we, in future, to be
prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient
mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be
invented, it would be very prudent in the legislature to adopt it; but until we have some
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atrocities that occurred when the Stuarts reigned in England. °3 In refusing to fall
into its old habit of using an historical analysis, however, the Court stated that
punishments should be defined in accordance with society's current views of
justice:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from
an experience of evils but its general language should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth." 4
In determining that the law at issue here was cruel and unusual, the Court
based its decision on the fact that the Constitution was capable of change and
"may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justce."105 Apparently, the Court felt that a modem, more humane society would
not impose such a harsh sentence on Weems. Further, the Court's notation that
he would not only be subject to harsh physical punishment, but would be "forever
kept under the shadow of his crime,"' suggests that the Court was concerned
about the prisoner's dignity as well. Finally, another factor that the Court con-
sidered was that there were no laws in the states similar to this law of the
Philippine Islands."°7
security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary
laws by any declaration of this kind.
Id. at 369.
103. Id. at 371-73. Although the Court cited Story, who authored a treatise on the Constitution, Patrick
Henry of the Virginia Convention, and Mr. Wilson of the Pennsylvania Convention, and regarded these
authorities as all referring to the reign of the Stuart monarchs as the reason for the clause, the Court disagreed
that this was the Clause's only purpose. Rather, the Court noted that the Framers wrote the Constitution
because of a fear of political power and must have contemplated the types of cruel punishments one could
inflict based on one's political power. The Court stated that the Framers
must have [contemplated] that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than
those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation. With power in a legislature great, if not
unlimited, to give criminal character to the actions of men, with power unlimited to fix
terms of imprisonment with what accompaniments they might, what more potent
instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power? And it was believed that
power might be tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of the Clause, and if we are to
attribute an intelligent providence to its advocates we cannot think that it was intended
to prohibit only practices like the Stuarts, or to prevent only an exact repetition of
history.
Id. at 372-73.
104. Id. at 373.
105. Id. at 378.
106. Id. at 366.
107. Id. at 377.
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The concepts hinted at in Weems became grounded after the Court's decision
in Trop v. Dulles.10 8 In Trop, the Court held that section 401(g) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1944, which provided that a wartime deserter
would lose his citizenship if he was dismissed or dishonorably discharged,
constituted cruel and unusual punishment."° The Court noted that although the
punishment did not amount to torture or extreme physical punishment, it was
cruel and unusual because it destroyed a man's "status in the national and
international political community."" 0 A state could impose various sanctions on
him, such as banishment, and it was this threat of an unknown fate that was too
overwhelming to endure."' In so stating, the Court reiterated the concept of
dignity hinted at in Weems:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man.... The Amendment stands to assure that this power
[to punish] be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Fines,
imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the
enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these
traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect. "2
Thus, by the latter half of the twentieth century, the notion of cruel and
unusual punishment was no longer measured by comparing a punishment with
punishments in the past. Instead, it was firmly accepted that the Eighth Amend-
ment embraced "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society..'".3 Some courts described the Clause as embodying "broad and
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency,"" 4 that
prohibited punishments which "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
108. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
109. Id. at 101.
110. Id.
I11. Id. at 102.
112. Id. at 100.
113. Id. at 101.
114. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (illustrating the Court's reliance on an evolving standard
of decency when interpreting the Eighth Amendment and quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th
Cir. 1968)): see Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 307 (1991) (White, J., concurring) (relying on a broad and
idealistic standard in analyzing an assertion by a prisoner of cruel and unusual punishment); Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678. 683-85 (1978) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits forms of punishment which
transgress today's broad and idealistic concepts of human dignity and decency); Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d
348,351 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1137 (1983) (holding that temporary confinement of a prisoner
at a facility where a prisoner was denied, inter alia, entry into the prison population and regular yard recreation
did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
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pain."'"15 Other courts assessed punishments in terms of their potential for painful
psychological consequences as well as their painful physical components."
6
While it may be viewed as an aberration, in the time span between Weems
and Trop the Court decided the case of Francis v. Resweber.t t7 An interesting
question was posed to the Court: Was it a denial of due process, in violation of
the Fifth Amendment prohibiting double jeopardy and the Eighth Amendment
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to execute the condemned prisoner
after one unsuccessful attempt had been made?".8 In this case, petitioner had been
convicted and sentenced to death for murder. On May 3, 1946, Francis underwent
preparations to die in the electric chair in Louisiana. Although a current of
electricity passed through his body," 9 because of a malfunction in the machine,
he did not die. Thereafter, the Governor of Louisiana issued a second death
warrant, which was the subject of this case. 2 '
The Court first stated that it was operating under the assumption, without
actually deciding, that violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments would be
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'2 ' The Court then decided that this
action was not violative of the Due Process Clause.'22 In holding that the punish-
115. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153. 173 (1976); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,669-70
(1977) (comparing the viability of Eighth Amendment claims of school children subjected to corporal
punishment with the claims of prisoners subjected to prison brutality, and finding that after a prisoner is
convicted and incarcerated, only the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment).
116. See Smith v. Aldingers, 999 F.2d 109, 110 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the district court erred in
failing to consider psychological effects of a prisoner's claim who witnessed a battery of another prisoner);
Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993) (recognizing serious emotional injury as a basis for
Eighth Amendment claim); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding a viable an Eighth
Amendment claim where emotional harm resulted from cross-gender clothed body search); Northington v.
Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that an Eighth Amendment claim resulted from death
threats by a person brandishing weapons); Anderson v. California, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649, 493 P.2d 880, 894, 100
Cal. Rptr. 152, 166 (1972) (holding that capital punishment was cruel and unusual because of its brutalizing
psychological effects as well as for other reasons); see also Mental Suffering, supra note 79, at 824 and cases
cited therein (stating that courts have considered mental suffering in finding punishments cruel, and that mental
suffering caused by imprisonment in overcrowded or unsanitary cells violates society's standards of human
dignity).
117. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
118. Francis, 329 U.S. at 460. Again, it should be noted that at this time, the Eighth Amendment still
was not applicable to the states. Marcus supra note 77, at 1334.
119. The following is an account of the first execution attempt, contained in a brief submitted by the
petitioner's attorney: After the petitioner had been strapped into a chair and a hood placed over his eyes, "the
electrocutioner turned on the switch and when he did Willie Francis' lips puffed out and he groaned and
jumped so that the chair came off the floor. Apparently the switch was turned on twice and then the condemned
man yelled: 'Take it off. Let me breath [sic]."' Another witness stated: "I saw the electrocutioner turn on the
switch and I saw his lips puff out and swell, his body tensed and stretched. I heard the one in charge yell to the
man outside for more juice when he saw that Willie Francis was not dying and the one on the outside yelled
back he was giving him all he had." Francis, 329 U.S. at 480 n.2.
120. Id. at 460-61.
121. Id. at 462.
122. Id. at 463-64.
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ment in this case was not cruel and unusual, the Court once again mentioned the
notion of humane justice."z It stated: "The traditional humanity of modem Anglo-
American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the
death sentence. Prohibition against the wanton infliction of pain has come into our
law from the Bill of Rights of 1688.'' 24 Rejecting petitioner's argument that
making him undergo the psychological preparations for a second electrocution
was cruel and unusual, the Court noted that the fact that he had already undergone
one electrocution did not make this electrocution more cruel than any other
execution."2
The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering
involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. The fact
that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt consummation of
the sentence cannot, it seems to us, add an element of cruelty to a
subsequent execution. There is no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor
any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution.
2 6
Although at first glance the decision in Francis appears contrary to the
standards of dignity, contemporary norms and humane justice espoused in Weems
and Trop, it is not necessarily so. The Court only determined whether the punish-
ment of death was unconstitutionally cruel in this case. As there was nothing in
the record to indicate that the State of Louisiana was intentionally inflicting
unnecessary pain on Francis in carrying out his death sentence, and the need to
resort to a second execution was simply due to an accident, the Court could
properly say his punishment was not cruel and unusual.
The Court made its determination by viewing the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause objectively.' From an objective viewpoint, the state did
nothing more than carry out the death sentence. As electrocution had previously
passed muster in Kemmler, objectively the state did not inflict any cruel punish-
ment on Francis, in the sense of violating his dignity or failing to comport with
contemporary norms of society. Many people today would disagree that Francis'
dignity was not violated, but to the Court, its decision was in keeping with its past
decisions.
In sum, these cases demonstrate how the interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment has progressed since its inception. No longer do courts resort to the
historical interpretation when faced with an Eighth Amendment issue. Instead,
judicial interpretation of the Clause had progressed to such a state that it really
123. Id. at 470.
124. Id. at 463.
125. Id. at 464.
126. Id.
127. Blum, supra note 79, at 445.
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encompasses four central ideas: physical pain, psychological pain, dignity of both
the prisoner and society, and contemporary norms of society. When these four
ideas are examined with regard to hanging, it becomes clear that hanging is
unconstitutional.
III. STATE COURT CONSIDERATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HANGING
As previously stated, while the Supreme Court has defined the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, it has not considered the constitutionality of any
method of execution. 28 However, there are several state courts that have been
confronted with the question of the constitutionality of hanging as a method of
execution. Interestingly, the majority of these courts have skirted the issue,
claiming that it is not the function of the court to substitute its judgment for that
of the legislature. 29 Thus, according to such reasoning, the legislature is better
able to determine whether hanging is the appropriate method of execution, and
since the legislature has deemed it appropriate, then it simply must not be cruel
and unusual.
The obvious flaw with this type of reasoning is that one of the functions of
the judiciary is to prohibit legislatures from enacting unconstitutional laws. Thus,
the courts relinquish their power to the legislature by blindly deferring to it. By
avoiding the difficult task of examining whether hanging is cruel, courts
ultimately fail in their duty to protect the public from unconstitutional laws
because justice is not administered. This is especially egregious because the
courts are perfectly capable of making this determination by holding an evi-
dentiary hearing. 3 Therefore, this line of reasoning simply makes no sense.
Courts have also utilized other weak arguments to avoid this difficult
constitutional determination. Some courts rely on the same cases that have
deferred the issue to the legislature, stating that the issue had previously been
128. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
129. See Kansas v. Kilpatrick, 439 P.2d 99, 110 (Kan. 1968) ("The legislature has chosen to prescribe
hanging by the neck as a means of execution in Kansas, and it is not for this court to determine the wisdom
of that decree."); Fitzpatrick v. Montana, 638 P.2d 1002, 1010 (Mont. 1981) (deferring issue to the legislature
since court had never determined whether any means of punishment violated the Eighth Amendment); Montana
v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000, 1059 (Mont. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 970 (1980) (noting that the legislature
refused to change the statute at issue and that "we have no power to change these settled provisions of the
law"). Courts that consider other methods of execution employ the same decision-making technique. See, e.g.,
Nevada v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 682 (Nev. 1923) (stating that "[Tihe Legislature has determined that the
infliction of the death penalty by the administration of lethal gas is humane, and it would indeed be not only
presumptuous, but boldness on our part, to substitute our judgment for theirs, even if we thought differently
upon the matter.").
130. See Fitzpatrick, 638 P.2d at 1053 (Morrison, J., dissenting) (noting that only the judiciary and not
the legislature is capable of determining if punishments violate the Clause, and therefore the defendant was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing for the court to properly consider the medical evidence on hanging).
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decided.' In Andrews v. Morris32 the Supreme Court of Utah utilized another
avoidance technique. The defendant argued that both shooting and hanging were
cruel and unusual, citing Coker v. Georgia3 for this proposition. " The supreme
court reasoned that Coker's holding, that the death penalty was barbaric and
excessive punishment for the crime of rape, could not be "strained to cover the
means of imposing the death penalty in an appropriate case.'9
35
A. Washington
In the State of Washington, the attitude of the judiciary towards hanging
appears somewhat mixed. The supreme court of Washington first considered
whether hanging was cruel and unusual punishment in Washington v.
Frampton.36 Although the holding appears to be that death by hanging was not
cruel and unusual punishment, a close reading of the case leaves confusion in the
mind of the reader.37
Justice Dolliver, writing the majority opinion for the court sitting en banc,
thoroughly considered the evidence and arguments of counsel before deciding
that hanging was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution. First, Justice Dolliver noted that the State provided no current
cases which held that hanging was constitutional or that actually discussed any
standards. 38 The court then noted the proper standard to be used in making this
determination in light of the Supreme Court's cases on cruel and unusual
131. This is a favorite excuse with the Montana Supreme Court. See McKenzie v. Osborne, 640 P.2d
368, 382 (Mont. 1981) (stating that the issue has fully been decided by the court and then citing its previous
decision in Montana v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000, 1058-59 (Mont. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 970 (1980),
where the court refused to usurp the legislature's function); see also Montana v. Fitzpatrick, 684 P.2d 1112,
1113 (Mont. 1984) (referring to its previous rejection of the argument in Fitzpatrick v. Montana, 638 P.2d 1002
(Mont. 1981)).
132. 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980).
133. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
134. Andrews, 607 P.2d at 819.
135. Id. at 824. It should be noted that Utah no longer permits hanging; rather, under its current statute,
it gives the prisoner a choice between lethal injection and death by firing squad. UTAH COD3ANN. § 77-18-5.5
(1993).
136. 627 P.2d 922 (Wash. 1981). At the time, Washington used hanging as its only method of execution.
137. The confusion occurs because Justice Dolliver, who wrote the majority opinion, found hanging to
be unconstitutional. However. the only way to determine that the court did not adopt Justice Dolliver's holding
is by reading the opinion of each separate justice. Some justices, however, did not write, or wrote an opinion
without discussing the hanging issue, thus leaving the reader even more confused. Several courts have
interpreted Frampton differently, some holding that it found hanging to be unconstitutional, and others holding
that it found hanging constitutional. Compare Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966, 971 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(stating that plaintiff's eyewitness descriptions of death by lethal gas are comparable to eyewitness descriptions
of death by hanging in Frampton, a decision which found hanging to be unconstitutional) and Calhoun v.
Maryland, 468 A.2d 45, 70 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that Washington banned the use of hanging in
Frampton) with Washington v. Duhaime, 631 P.2d 964, 971 (Wash. App. 1981) (stating that Frampton held
hanging was constitutional).
138. Frampton, 627 P.2d at 933.
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punishment. 39 Given that only four jurisdictions in the English-speaking world
utilized hanging as a method of execution, Justice Dolliver remarked that hanging
could hardly qualify as compatible with the evolving standards of decency as
announced in Trop v. Dulles.'40 Second, Justice Dolliver discussed the medical
evidence which he found convincing in making his determination.' 4' On the one
hand, he noted that the State's expert witnesses did not present much detailed
evidence, and in fact one witness had never attended a judicial hanging, while the
State's other witness had attended three in 1945.42 Both experts concluded that
hanging resulted in severance of the spinal cord and immediate unconsciousness,
although immediate was defined as taking up to ten seconds.
143
On the other hand, the defense's experts presented detailed evidence about
the consequences of hanging. 44 This evidence led Justice Dolliver to conclude
that in the "great majority of cases death by hanging does involve slow, lingering
death."' 45 In most cases, people died by suffocating or strangling, which could
take several minutes to occur, as opposed to dying by spinal severance, which
was the intended consequence of hanging.t 46Further, even if the spinal cord was
completely severed, it did not necessarily mean that unconsciousness would
result. If there was less than complete severance, death could take considerably
longer. 47 This evidence was supported by three defense experts.
148
The defense also presented testimony of eyewitnesses to judicial hangings.
One witness, Clinton Duffy, a former warden of San Quentin Prison, gave a
particularly gruesome account:
The executioner put the noose over the man's head with a knot under the
left ar.... I gave the nod, OK, and he raised his hand and these men in
the little room saw that and they cut the springs which sprung the trap.
The man hit the bottom and I observed that he was fighting by pulling on
the straps, wheezing, whistling, trying to get air, and that blood was
139. Id. at 933-34. These standards include "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency." Id. at 933 (citing Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,579 (8th Cir. 1968)). Punishment
which does not conform to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"
or which "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain are repugnant to the Eighth Amendment" Id.
at 933-34 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
140. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Justice Dolliver was referring to Delaware, Washington, Montana and South
Africa. Frampton, 627 P.2d at 934. However, it appears that New Hampshire had also adopted hanging as its
method of execution prior to 1981. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 Notes on History and Amendments
(Supp. 1993) (describing the previous versions of New Hampshire's death penalty statute).
141. Frampton, 627 P.2d at 934-35.






148. Id. at 934-35.
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oozing through the black cap. I observed also that he urinated, defecated,
and droppings fell to the floor, and the stench was terrible. I also saw
witnesses pass out and have to be carried from the witness room. Some
of them threw up. After a doctor had placed a stool in front of the man,
he ripped his shirt open, put the stethoscope over his heart, and between
eight and thirteen minutes later, the doctor pronounced the man dead by
no heartbeat.
1 49
When the man was taken down and his black cap removed, Duffy testified he
noticed that "big hunks of flesh were toro off" the side of his face where the
noose had been, "his eyes were popped," his tongue was "swollen and hanging
from his mouth," and he had turned purple. 50
In another account:
[The trap door was sprung. He fell through the trap door some feet
going out of my sight since I was standing on the platform. He
disappeared from my view; but when he hit the end of the rope he
bounced so hard that his head and shoulders came back up above the
floor of the platform, which was a surprise to me. He bounced several
times. He then again, contrary to what was shown in the films, engaged
in gyrations. Though his ankles and wrists were bound together, there
was a great deal of motion, torso twisting, which motion continued, as I
recall, for perhaps five minutes; and then began to decline in frequency
and amount. After ten minutes or so I saw no further motion.' 5'
He further noted that he waited at least twenty minutes, only to find that the
victim still had an irregular pulse.
52
The accounts of bungling 53 presented by the defense were numerous. In one
case, a man strangled to death only after pleading with his executioners to be
sprung from the drop again.t " In another account, the victim was partially
decapitated and took nineteen minutes to die.
55
Based on this evidence, the absence of trained hangmen at the Washington
State Penitentiary, and the fact that the prison authorities were unaware of any
trained hangmen in the United States, Justice Dolliver concluded that hanging
149. Id. at 935
150. Id.
151. Id. at 935-36. This account was given by Dr. Clarence Schmg, Professor of Sociology at the
University of Washington, and former Director of Corrections for the Washington Slate Department of
Institutions.
152. Id. at 936.
153. Id.; see infra notes 217-234 and accompanying text (providing more detail on the concept of
"bungling").
154. Frampton, 627 P.2d at 936.
155. Id.
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was the kind of "cruel, wanton and barbarous act which offends civilized
standards of decency."' 56 He then concluded that hanging violates the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, Section 14, of the Washington
State Constitution.5 7
Most of the justices then gave their separate opinions. Concurring with
Justice Dolliver on the hanging issue were Justices Williams 58 and Utter 59
Justices Hicks, t6° Dimmick, t6' and Chief Justice Brachtenbach t62 did not address
the hanging issue. Three other justices dissented. 63 Citing a lack of objectivity by
the court, Justice Stafford gave the favorite explanation that the legislature was
"the body most closely representative of the people whose standards of decency
are said to be impacted."'" As such, it was best to defer to the legislature. Justice
Rosellini also felt that it was a decision for the legislature, as there was no
definitive evidence that hanging was unnecessarily cruel. 65 Not surprisingly, the
reason given for Justice Dore's dissent was the same as the others.'
The Washington Supreme Court later clarified its position in Frampton by its
decision in Washington v. Rupe.'67 In Rupe, the Washington Supreme Court was
faced with another challenge to the constitutionality of the state's death penalty
statute.'a The amended statute gave the person facing execution a choice between
156. Id.
157. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"); WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 14 ("excessive bail shall not be required,
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted").
158. Frampton, 627 P.2d at 936-38.
159. Id. at 945-47.
160. Without writing an opinion, Justice Hicks merely concurred on the hanging issue, thus implying
he agreed with the majority opinion by Justice Dolliver. Id. at 945. However, his vote was given after Justice
Stafford's dissent on the hanging issue, id. at 944-45, thereby also implying he agreed with that dissent.
161. Like Justice Hicks, Justice Dimmick also concurred on the hanging issue after Stafford's dissent.
Id. at 945. He also wrote a separate opinion but failed to address the hanging issue. Id. at 952-53.
162. Chief Justice Brachtenbach also concurred after Justice Stafford's dissent. Id. at 945. He did not
address the hanging issue when voting on the other issues elsewhere in the opinion. Id. at 948, 953.
163. These were Justices Rosellini, id. at 938-44, Stafford, id. at 94445, and Dore, id. at 948-52.
164. Id. at 945 (Stafford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 944 (Rosellini, J., dissenting in part).
166. Id. at 92 (Dore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. 683 P.2d 571 (Wash. 1984).
168. Rupe, 683 P.2d at 576; see WASH. RE'V. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180 (Vest 1990) ("The punishment
of death shall be... inflicted either by hanging by the neck or, at the election of the defendant, by intravenous
injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death and until the defendant is
dead:). The death penalty provision was amended in 1981 shortly after the Frampton decision so as to include
the choice of lethal injection as a method of execution.
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death by hanging or death by lethal injection. Holding that it was not
unconstitutional to present a choice to a person on death row, the court first noted
that neither side presented any evidence to support its position. 69 However,
logic dictates neither result. Individual reactions to the various methods
of execution and the right to choose vary greatly. In some cases, a person
may be so appalled by the thought of physically hanging by the neck that
the option of death by lethal injection is welcome. To others, the idea of
lying strapped upon a gurney awaiting the lethal poison to seep into
one's veins at an unknown time may be equally abhorrent. These
individuals embrace the idea of choosing the method of their death as a
way to avoid their own private terrors. But to a third type of individual,
the choice itself is cruel. As they await the day of their death, they are
faced not only with the terror of death itself but also with the choice on
how to die. These individuals do not embrace the idea of choice; they
dread its requirement that they take an active part in their own demise.70
The supreme court then reasoned that in either situation, with or without the
choice, the court is imposing its personal view of cruelty over the views of
condemned felons. By removing the choice, the court was imposing a method of
execution upon those who feared that type of execution; by retaining the choice,
the court imposed its views on those who feared choosing the method of their
death.' However, since there was no evidence that having to choose the method
psychologically affected the prisoner, or that the defendant would undergo any
sort of psychological trauma by having to choose, the court refused to "speculate"
that it was more cruel to impose a choice upon the prisoners.'72 Not only is this
case important because it is the first case to address whether a choice of methods
was constitutional, 73 but also because the court expressly stated that it found
hanging to be constitutional in Frampton.!7'
169. Defendant argued that giving a person a choice between methods of death was unconstitutional,
while the State argued that giving a choice was less cruel than imposing one method or the other without any
choice. Rupe, 683 P.2d at 593.
170. Id. at 594.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Although an earlier case, Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1915), held that a statute
providing a choice between methods was not an unlawful bill of attainder or an ex post facto law, Rape appears
to be the first case to determine if the choice itself was constitutional. Further, in Delaware v. Bailey, No. 1K79-
05-0085RI, 1991 Del. Super. LEXIS 352 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1991), the only other court outside the State
of Washington to address this issue merely cited Rupe without conducting any independent analysis. See infra
notes 187-197 and accompanying text (describing the holding in Bailey).
174. Rape, 683 P.2d at 593.
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B. Delaware
The law in Delaware parallels the law in Washington when it comes to these
issues. In DeShields v. Delaware,75 the Delaware Supreme Court specifically
held that death by hanging was'constitutional. The court first noted that plaintiff
lacked standing to challenge the sentence of death by hanging because, after
plaintiff was sentenced to die, the Delaware Legislature changed the statute to
death by lethal injection.176 The new statute provided that all persons sentenced
to die for acts committed before the date of enactment could elect to choose lethal
injection as the method of death instead of hanging.t" Thus, since plaintiff had
a choice, and could choose not to undergo death by hanging, his challenge was
non-justiciable.1
78
The supreme court, however, then considered plaintiffs objections to
hanging, using historical interpretation to hold that hanging was constitutional.'79
Given the fact that Delaware had selected hanging as its method for of execution
nearly 250 years, many legislators considered it an appropriate method.'
Further, since it was also an alternative to lethal injection if lethal injection should
be found unconstitutional, the court concluded that there was no legislative intent
to repeal hanging from the statute.' 8'
Nor did the court find that it was cruel and unusual in light of the Delaware
Constitution. First, the plaintiff offered no facts to support his argument that if
properly performed, hanging caused unnecessary torture.'82 Second, he did not
offer any evidence that the procedures for hanging were susceptible to accidents
or bungling."s The court also relied on Frampton'4 and Colemant85 as further
support that hanging was constitutional. 86
175. 534 A.2d 630 (Del. 1987). DeShields was executed by lethal injection on August 31, 1993, having
spent many years on death row after conviction for a murder committed in 1984. National Briefs, HOUSTON
CHRON., Sept. 1, 1993, at 14.
176. DeShields was sentenced to die on April 4, 1986, and in June of that same year the death penalty
statute was amended. DeShields, 534 A.2d at 639 (citing 65 DEL. LAws 281 § 1 (1986) (effective June 13,
1986)).
177. DeShields , 534 A.2d at 639 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(0 (1993)). As previously noted,
under the current statute, Delaware retains hanging only for cases in which lethal injection is found
unconstitutional. See supra note 6 (describing, inter alia, the Delaware death penalty statute).
178. DeShields, 534 A.2d at 639.
179. Id.; see supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing the "historical interpretation" method of
constitutional analysis).




184. 627 P.2d 922 (Wash. 1981); see supra notes 136-166 and accompanying text (discussing the
holding in Frampton).
185. 605 P.2d 1000 (Mont. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 970 (1980); see supra notes 129, 131
(discussing the holding in Coleman).
186. DeShields, 534 A.2d at 640.
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Further similarity between the laws of Washington and Delaware can be
found in the case of Delaware v. Bailey. 87 Bailey, who elected in 1986 to be
executed by hanging, argued that both hanging and lethal injection, as well as the
requirement that defendants choose the means of death, all violated the U.S. and
Delaware Constitutions.t1 8 He also asked for an evidentiary hearing to determine
if it was possible to assure death without unnecessary pain and delay from these
methods, and whether the state was presently capable of conducting an execution
in a manner so as not to cause unnecessary pain or delay.'89 Similar to the
Washington Supreme Court's reasoning, the Delaware Superior Court noted that
Bailey lacked standing to challenge death by lethal injection because he had
chosen death by hanging."g Likewise, the Delaware Superior Court failed to find
that hanging was unconstitutional.' 9' While Bailey presented historical evidence
that not all hangings produced instantaneous deaths, Bailey failed to establish that
his own execution would involve "unnecessary torture, unneeded terror, pain, or
disgrace, a lingering death, or that it is so susceptible to accidents as to be
unconstitutional."' 92 The court relied on affidavits from the Department of
Corrections which stated that Bailey's execution would be implemented by
following past regulations of the U.S. Department of the Army.'93 This was
enough to prevent any further inquiry into the methods used by the Department
of Corrections officials. The court hinted that, in any event, Bailey's point was
moot because he had a choice to elect death by lethal injection, although he did
not do so.t9
Without any real analysis, the superior court rejected Bailey's argument that
the choice also violated the Constitution. Citing Washington v. Rupe, 95 the court
stated that the existence of a choice did not require that a choice be made.
96
Finally, the court rejected Bailey's request for an evidentiary hearing, stating
simply, without reason, that Bailey's submissions did not overcome the pre-
sumption that the Department of Corrections would carry out the procedure
properly.' 97 Thus, as in the Washington cases, the plaintiff had failed to prove that
the method or the choice between the methods was unconstitutional.
187. No. IK79-05-0085RI, 1991 Del. Super. LEXIS 352 (Del. Super. C1. Aug. 23, 1991).
188. Baley, 1991 Del. Super. LEXIS 352 at *4.
189. Id. at *59.
190. Id. at *56.
191. Id. at *57.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at *58 (stating that "because Bailey has rejected the option to die by lethal injection, he has
waived any constitutional objection to hanging" (citing DeShields, 534 A.2d at 639)).
195. 683 P.2d 571,594 (1984).
196. Bailey, 1991 Del. Super. LEXIS 352 at *58.
197. Id. at *59.
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C. Montana
One final case merits discussion. Apparently following the decisions of the
supreme courts of Washington and Delaware, the Montana Supreme Court
recently held that the defendant's failure to choose death by lethal injection
rendered moot his argument that hanging was cruel and unusual punishment"98
Thus, in states where petitioners have a choice, they are put in a quandary. If they
choose one method of execution, they have no standing to challenge the other
method. If they choose one method and attack the constitutionality of that
method, then their attack will not be considered since they could have chosen the
other method. Thus, petitioners can never win when they are given the choice.
And, as the courts have explained, the choice is constitutional.' 9 The courts have
found the perfect way to avoid the issue because by keeping the choice, the courts
never have to address the attacks on the specific methods of execution. Rather,
they can hide behind the legal excuses of lack of standing and non-justiciability.
However, as Justice Dolliver's ignored majority opinion demonstrates,2 it is




Once one considers the evidence about hanging, it seems clear that hanging
is unconstitutional under the four guidelines considered by the Supreme Court in
cruel and unusual punishment cases: physical pain, psychological pain, dignity
of the prisoner and society, and contemporary norms of society.2"' Unfortunately,
as the last section shows, courts rarely reach the merits of arguments raised by
persons challenging the constitutionality of hanging. This is because no state
imposes death by hanging unilaterally, and the defendant for all practical
purposes can now choose an alternative method. 2 However, as will be discussed
later in this article, the existence of such a choice should not preclude challenges
to the constitutionality of hanging.
203
198. Montana v. Langford, 833 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Mont. 1992) (citing DeShlelds, 534 A.2d 630).
199. See supra note 173.
200. See supra notes 138-157 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Dolliver's majority opinion
in Washington v. Hampton, 627 P.2d 922 (Wash. 1981)).
201. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing the four-part framework used by the Court
in analyzing cruel and unusual punishment cases).
202. See supra note 6 (describing the state death penalty statutes which include hanging as a means of
execution).
203. See infra notes 288-297 and accompanying text (describing problems which arise when prisoners
are faced with a choice of methods of execution).
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1. Physical Pain
The foremost concern with execution by hanging is whether it causes
unnecessary pain. Obviously, any type of execution will involve some sort of
pain; however, if one method is considerably less painful than all others, then it
should be the method employed. If hanging is unnecessarily painful, it does not
fall within the standards of the Eighth Amendment.
Teeters suggests that, if properly performed, death by hanging is
instantaneous, or if not instantaneous, at least unconsciousness occurs almost
instantaneously. If that is the case, then the only pain the victim feels is the
initial sensation when the body is dropped and the spinal cord is severed, which
may take a matter of seconds."5 In fact, there have been reports of people in
England in the nineteenth century who survived attempted hangings, and all
reported that they felt no pain.2°0 For instance, "[a]n acquaintance of Lord Bacon
who meant to hang himself partially lost his footing and was cut down at the last
extremity ... and declared he felt no pain and his only sensation was fire before
his eyes which changed first to black and then to sky blue."' 7 Whether these
accounts are accurate, of course, we have no way of knowing. However, all the
experts emphasize that a successful hanging, i.e., one where the spinal cord is
severed, depends on proper placement of the knot of the noose behind the ear, as
well as the proper length of the rope in conjunction with the weight and height of
the victim.20' Thus,
the drop must be just long enough to produce dislocation of the spinal
cord, not so long as to result in decapitation, yet not so short as to result
in slow strangulation. The line between the "intense agony" of
strangulation and dislocation short of decapitation is so fine as to require
the executioner to calculate the length of the drop from the condemned
man's weight and physical condition with the use of a chart.? 9
204. TEETERS, supra note 22, at 154-55 (quoting Henry L. Mencken as stating that "hanging, if
competently carried out, is a humane method of putting criminals to death" and "in most cases causes
immediate unconsciousness, or, at all events, such a shattering of the faculties that he is hardly able to suffer").
Further, although Teeters makes this suggestion, he stresses that the degree of pain involved from hanging
depends on the competence in the art of hanging. In so stating, he notes that history is replete with incidents
of bungling. Id. at 155.
205. Id. at 155.
206. Id. at 154.
207. Id. (quoting an account taken from the Quarterly Review in 1849).
208. Marcus, supra note 77, at 1340; TEETERS, supra note 22, at 157 (noting that the "height of the drop
in ratio with the weight of the victim's body plus the skill in adjusting the knol, theoretically revolutionized
hanging").
209. Marcus, supra note 77, at 1340.
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Further, the knot must be placed on the lower left jaw.2t0 If it is placed under the
right side of the neck, the head will be forced forward and strangulation will
result.2t
Opponents of the abolishment of hanging may argue that once the art of
hanging is perfected, then spinal dislocation will always occur, and there is no
possibility of decapitation or strangulation. The problem is that it does not seem
possible to perfect hanging without experimenting on people first, which
obviously is not an option. Nonetheless, some have argued that the technique can
be perfected. In 1953, the English concluded that they perfected the art of hanging
and there had been no mishaps in the preceding fifty years.2" 2 However, a Welsh
pathologist who testified at Charles Campbell's hearing in June of 1993, stated
that out of his findings from a study of 34 persons who underwent judicial
hangings in Great Britain, only two of them had actually died of a broken neck.
2,3
Further, one English surgeon reported the following after witnessing a double
execution in 1927:
The bodies were cut down after fifteen minutes and placed in an
antechamber, when I was horrified to hear one of the supposed corpses
give a gasp and find him making spasmodic respiratory efforts, evidently
a prelude to revival. The two bodies were quickly suspended again for a
quarter of an hour longer. The executioner, who was thoroughly
experienced, had done his part without a hitch, and the drop given was
the regulation one according to individual physique. Dislocation of the
neck is the ideal aimed at, but, out of all my post-mortem findings, that
has proven rather an exception, while in the majority of instances the
cause of death was strangulation and asphyxia.
2 14
While capital punishment was eventually abolished in England in 1965, it is
reported that prior to abolition, hangmen in England left prisoners hanging for a
full hour before taking them down.?t5 Reports also abound of victims who took
as long as 15 to 18 minutes or longer to die.
2t6
210. TEETERS, supra note 22, at 156.
211. Id. at 156-57 (noting that if the knot is under the left side of the jaw, then it finishes under the chin
when the victim is hung and causes the chin to be thrown back, breaking the prisoner's neck).
212. Marcus, supra note 77, at 1340.
213. Gallows Gear, supra note 41, at BI.
214. Marcus, supra note 77, at 1340 (quoting a letter to the British Medical Journal, Feb. 19, 1927).
215. Id. at 1340-41.
216. Gardner, supra note 77, at 121 (quoting an account reported by Clinton Duffy, a former prison
warden, who participated in over 60 hangings); see also KOESTLmER, supra note 16, at 140-41 (noting the
Encyclopedia Britannica. 1955 edition, indirectly expressed skepticism following publication of the Royal
Commission investigations by stating, "It is said that the dislocation of the vertebrae causes immediate
unconsciousness ... the heart may continue to beat for up to 20 minutes but this is thought to be a purely
automatic function." (emphasis added by A. Koestler)); id. at I 1 (stating that victims in the nineteenth century
were frequently still alive after 15 to 20 minutes).
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Related to the consideration of whether death or unconsciousness is
instantaneous is the phenomenon of "bungling."2 7 While many of the cases of
bungling occurred in the nineteenth century, perhaps when people were not as
enlightened about hanging techniques, there is still evidence of bungling in the
twentieth century, even after the weight charts and placement of the knot has
supposedly been perfected."' As stated by Arthur Koestler in his Reflections on
Hanging, bunglings
are not entirely matters of the distant past. Official hypocrisy, taking
advantage of the fact that executions are no longer public, pretends that
modernized hanging is a nice and smooth affair which is always carried
out "expeditiously and without a hitch." But the hanging of the
Nuremberg war criminals in 1946 was as terribly bungled, and the
hanging of Mrs. Thompson in 1923 was a butchery as revolting, as any
reported in the Newgate Calendar. Her executioner attempted suicide a
short time later, and the prison chaplain stated that "the impulse to rush
in and save her by force was almost too strong for him." Yet Government
spokesmen tell us that all executions are smooth and nice, and
Government spokesmen are honorable men.2 9
When the hanging does not proceed as planned, the results are disastrous.22
One account, as recorded in the 1954 edition of Charles Duff's Handbook on
Hanging:
As the body dropped to a standstill a heavy gurgling sound was heard,
and soon the blood in torrents commenced pouring on the stone floor
below. The cap was raised and it was found that decapitation was almost
complete, the head hanging to the body only by a small piece of skin at
the back of the neck. During the half-minute or more that the heart beat,
the blood was thrown against the platform above from the exposed gash
caused by the head being pulled on the shoulder.
221
The other consequences of bungling can be just as gruesome and painful as
decapitation. Strangulation, for instance, is another consequence of bungling,
which is accompanied by kicking convulsions and much struggling.2 22 This can
217. This term is used by Teeters to describe incidents of blundered hangings. TEmTIRS, supra note 22,
at 173-81.
218. KOErLER, supra note 16, at 141 (reporting that a bungled execution took place in 1942).
219. Id. at 11.
220. While it is not the intention of this author to shock the reader by these gory accounts, they are
necessary in order to understand the potential consequences if hanging is to remain a method of execution in
the present day. For further accounts of bungling, see TIETMRS, supra note 22, at 173-81.
221. Stephen Aylett, Hanging bya Thread, 138 NEW LJ. 331 (1988).
222. Id.
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last several minutes before one actually dies from strangulation.p One
commentator notes that "strangulation may be the rule rather than the
exception." 4 There is also the chance that part of the body, especially the face,
will be mutilated.' While the face is covered by the hood, often the eyes pop, the
tongue swells, veins explode, the face and neck turn purple, and the neck
elongates and distorts.226
Finally, it should be noted that the hangings of Westley Allan Dodd and
Charles Campbell establish that even in the present day, hangings do not go as
expected. Although Dodd's hanging appeared to have proceeded in a proper
manner and none of the witnesses reported any evidence of consciousness in their
notes, 7 the medical examiner, Dr. Donald Reay, reported that the cause of death
was separation of Dodd's cervical vertebrae and strangulation.228 Dodd's neck
was not broken, which was the intended effect of the hanging? 9 Dr. Reay
reported that death was most likely painless because the first injury was the
tearing of Dodd's ligaments in his neck, and this most likely rendered him uncon-
scious very quickly. S° Death probably also occurred in two to three minutes.?
However, Dr. Reay was surprised that Dodd's neck was not broken. 3
2
According to reports, Campbell's execution was not entirely successful
either. Campbell, who weighed approximately 220 pounds when he was hanged,
was nearly decapitated during the hanging.233 Experts reported he suffered severe
neck damage, and that his spinal cord and vertebrae were separated.
2. Psychological Pain
The previous section discussed the possibility of physical pain experienced
by the prisoner. Another aspect that must be considered, in order to truly apply
223. Id.
224. Gardner, supra note 77, at 120 (noting that death by strangulation is undoubtedly extremely
painful).
225. Id. at 121; see also TEEr ERS. supra note 22, at 176.
226. TEETERS, supra note 22, at 176; Gardner, supra note 77, at 121.
227. Murderer Felt Little Pain, supra note 2, at 9.





233. Jack Broom, Expert: Rape's Decapitation Risk 80-90%--State Attorney Puts Little Stock in
Testimony as Overneight KillerAppeals Death Sentence, SEATTLE TIMES, July 14, 1994, at B3 [hereinafter
Decapitation Risk]; Rebecca J. Fowler, At 409 Pounds, Is He Too Heavy To Hang?, INTL HERALD TRB., Aug.
5, 1994, at News Sec.; Gallows Drop, supra note 7, at A8.
234. Gallows Drop, supra note 7. at 48; Fowler, supra note 233. It should be noted that the injuries
suffered by Campbell have not been conclusively determined. Although Alan Tencer, the director of the
biomechanics laboratory at Harborview Medical Center testified in federal court about Campbell's injuries,
Assistant Attorney General John Samson raised the question of whether Tencer actually examined Campbell.
See Decapitation Risk, supra note 233, at B3.
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evolving standards of a civilized society, is the possibility of psychological pain
caused by hanging.
For some people, the mere thought of hanging evokes a violent reaction.
Consider for a moment that you had been convicted of murder in a state that uses
only hanging for capital punishment. How would you react to dying in this man-
ner (once you got used to the idea that you were going to die at all)? Or, suppose
you were given the choice between hanging and lethal injection. Which would
you choose? Common sense tells us that the majority.of persons would choose
lethal injection. While the author knows of no studies that have been conducted
on this issue, the reason for this choice is fairly clear. Lethal injection involves
a fairly simple and familiar procedure. 6 In all likelihood, everyone has received
an injection or had blood drawn at some point in their lives. The procedure of
lethal injection is relatively painless, aside from the initial pinprick, and the
person usually falls into unconsciousness within the first few seconds.237 In fact,
the only sort of bungling problem reported about lethal injection is that medical
technicians sometimes have difficulty locating the inmate's vein, 8 although
death penalty opponents also cite ruptured veins, failure to immediately induce
unconsciousness and inaccurate dosages as other examples of bungling.P9 Fur-
ther, the clinical aspect of the procedure seems to be soothing because it is some-
thing familiar to the prisoner.240
235. As previously discussed, this concept was considered by the Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958). See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text. Commentators have suggested that persons on death
row undergo mental suffering which may also be violative of the Eighth Amendment, and that mental suffering
is demonstrated by use of defense mechanisms such as denial of the death sentence. The person facing death
may also undergo stark terror, and the increasing delay between the sentence and the actual death may also
produce mental suffering. Mental Suffering, supra note 79, at 824-3 1.
236. It has been noted that the first phase of death by lethal injection is almost exactly the same as the
procedure used to anesthetize a person for surgery. Paul Jacobs, E recution by Lethal Injection OK'd, L.A.
TIEs, Aug. 29, 1992, at 17. Medical technicians first inject a series of chemicals to anesthetize the inmate,
and then a second round of chemicals is injected which operates to stop the heartbeat. Id.
237. Lethal injection is "the only form of execution which from our own life's experience, we can
conclude is entirely devoid of discomfort." Id. (quoting California Assemblymember Tom McClintock),
238. Id.
239. The Firm That Outfits Death Row, Clt. TRiB., June 12, 1988, at F13.
240. Some states that have adopted lethal injection use what is known as a lethal injection machine
instead of medical technicians to administer the drugs. This procedure is still similar to preparation for surgery,
and thus the familiarity aspect is not removed. The prisoner is strapped to a gumey and has an intravenous tube
in his arm. The tube is attached to a tube in the machine, and a heart monitor is also attached to the prisoner.
In Illinois, two persons each push a button, one of which activates the machine (so neither operator knows who
activated it). The machine then goes through cycles and administers the drugs via the tube inserted in the
prisoner's ann. Illinois uses three drugs: sodium pentothal to put the prisoner to sleep, pancuroniuin bromide
to stop his breathing, and potassium chloride to stop his heart. Rob Karwath, Death'sArrival One of Precision,
CH .TRIB., Sept. 1I, 1990, at C6.
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Hanging, on the other hand, involves none of these aspects. Very few people
have previously undergone experiences similar to hanging.24 Thus, it is a foreign
experience, and common sense tells us that things which are unknown are
typically feared. Further, hanging lacks the clinical aspect that is present with
lethal injection. The person must walk up to the gallows, where her legs and
wrists are tied together, a rope is placed around her neck, and a white or black cap
placed over her head.242 While the cap is intended to protect the onlookers from
the gruesome view of the person being hanged, it cannot provide much comfort
to the victim, who may feel the added sensation that she is about to suffocate.
Moreover, the person facing hanging not only must deal with the fact that
death may be painful, but that he may also be decapitated or strangled. Further,
almost every hanging results in some mutilation of the body.243 Even if death is
not painful, persons who are hung must also contemplate that their deaths may be
gruesome and that this will take place in front of the number of witnesses who are
watching the event.2'
It is likely that the only people who would choose hanging over lethal
injection are those that have a specific aversion to needles, leaving death by
hanging as the only viable option, or persons like Dodd, who specifically chose
hanging as a means of punishment because he hung his victims.245 Thus, the
potential for psychological pain and the possibility of physical pain, mutilation
and suffering in front of onlookers, all suggest that hanging destroys the dignity
of the condemned prisoner.
3. Modern Morality
The key phrase in Trop v. Dulles, "evolving standards of decency, ''246 has
particular importance in determining whether hanging is cruel and unusual
punishment. Even if it remains indeterminable whether hanging is painful or
241. This statement assumes that the majority of people do not engage in sexual gratification via
constriction of the neck, a very real phenomenon where persons suspend themselves in order to gain sexual
gratification. While it does not often occur, one unintended result of this activity is death "via autoerotic
asphyxiation." For a more thorough discussion of this phenomenon, see Ficarra, supra note 26, at 54-57.
242. See Gardner, supra note 77, at 121 (quoting Clinton Duffy as saying that "[hianging, whether the
prisoner is dropped through a trap after climbing a traditional 13 steps, or whether he is jerked from the floor
after having been strapped, black-capped and noosed, is a very gruesome method of execution.") Interestingly,
Dr. Ficarra notes that the cap is white, although it was erroneously depicted as black in movies. Ficarra, supra
note 26, at 46. Moreover, the cap is intended to protect onlookers from the sight in case of strangulation and
decapitation, and to prevent the victim from knowing when the lever was going to be pulled. Id.
243. "'[A]t best there is always the chance of popped eyes, purple countenance, swollen tongue and
exploded veins-but these are covered up by the black hood."' TEETRs, supra note 22, at 176 (quoting
Concern, a bi-monthly Journal of Opinion, New London, N.H., Nov. 17, 1961).
244. See Gardner, supra note 77, at 122 (stating that hanging is cruel because "[t]he physical violence
of hanging mutilates the body and offends the victim's right to bodily integrity, Privacy is invaded when
witnesses are permitted to attend the affair.").
245. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
246. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol 26
constitutes torture, the mere fact that it has fallen from use in comparison to other
methods of execution shows that it does not comport with society's current stan-
dards of decency. In a word, it is unusual. That hanging has fallen into disfavor
is a fact which can no longer be ignored. People conjure up the image of hanging
in their minds, and relate it to some barbaric practice that took place in England
in centuries past. 7 It was said over fifteen years ago that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause "originated in the English Declaration of Right of 1688 and
was designed to prohibit such practices as execution by hanging, drawing and
quartering, burning at the stake, the rack and the thumb screw." '248
Further, over a century ago, the governor of New York prompted the
Legislature to adopt electrocution over hanging as the method of execution by his
statement that "[t]he present mode of executing criminals by hanging has come
down to us from the dark ages, and it may well be questioned whether the science
of the present day cannot provide a means for taking the life of such as are con-
demned to die in a less barbarous manner."'249 When Montana changed its death
penalty statute in 1983 to allow a choice between hanging and lethal injection,
Justice Sheehy of the Montana Supreme Court stated that "the amendment [was]
an admission by the legislature that death by hanging is too horrible to con-
template."' "° Indeed, out of forty-six states that discarded hanging, thirty-nine
states chose alternative methods of execution because hanging was much too
horrible to contemplate.sl
Not only does the fact that a majority of states abandoned hanging in favor
of electrocution indicate that hanging is "unusual," but the fact that those alternate
methods are also undergoing criticism signifies that hanging does not comport
with society's contemporary standards. Of states that currently employ the death
penalty,"2 the majority use lethal injection.5 3 Electrocution is the second most
247. When the Supreme Court of California decided to abolish capital punishment in 1972, it stated that
in the late 1800's, hanging was a popular form of vigilante justice. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628,642,493
P.2d 880, 889, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 161 (1972).
248. Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 655 (6th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
249. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,444 (1890).
250. Montana v. Kills on Top, 787 P.2d 336, 356 (Mont. 1990) (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
251. See, e.g., Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 n.1 (1915) (reporting that many states such
as Ohio, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, South Carolina, Arkansas, Indiana,
Pennsylvania and Nebraska followed New York and adopted electrocution as a means of execution in place
of hanging with the idea that electrocution was "less painful and more humane than hanging"); see also
Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 697-98, (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, CJ., dissenting) (noting that the U.S.
Army also discarded hanging in 1986). Ironically, Washington uses the U.S. Army's protocol to conduct its
hangings. See Campbell v. Blodgett, No. C89-456C (W.D. Wash. June 1, 1993), at 2, 1 (copy on file with
the Pacific Law Journal). See also Brown v. Alabama, 264 So.2d 529, 537 (Ala. 1971) (stating that the
Louisiana Supreme Court also deemed electrocution more humane than hanging by its decision in State ex reL
Pierre v. Jones, 9 So.2d 42 (La. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 633 (1942)).
252. See Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966,971 (N.D. Ca]. 1992) (reporting that 38 states still employ
the death penalty).
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common method,' followed by the gas chamber z 5 hanginge 6 and shooting.
Electrocution has been abandoned by at least five states in favor of a more
humane method of execution, and commentators have suggested that it is also
cruel and unusual."8 Likewise, in California, the gas chamber was recently ruled
unconstitutional by U.S. District Judge Marilyn Hall Pasel, who previously
likened descriptions of executions by lethal gas to descriptions of executions by
253. At present, 26 states use lethal injection, although many of those states have provisions that allow
for a choice between lethal injection and another form of execution, or a provision deeming an alternative
method of execution if lethal injection is ruled unconstitutional. See ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-704 (1993)
(choice between lethal injection and lethal gas); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 (Michie 1993) (electrocution if
lethal injection is unconstitutional); CAL PENAL CODE § 3604(a) (West Supp. 1994) (choice between lethal
injection and lethal gas); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11401 (West Supp. 1993) (lethal injection); DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1992) (hanging if lethal injection is unconstitutional); IDAHO CODE § 19-2716 (1993)
(firing squad if lethal injection is impractical); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/119-5 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1994)
(electrocution if lethal injection is unconstitutional); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:569 (West 1992) (lethal
injection after Sept. 15, 1992; all others sentenced before that date receive electrocution); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 627 (Supp. 1994) (lethal injection);Mtss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51 (1993) (gas for execution of defendant's
sentenced before July 1. 1984, or if lethal injection is unconstitutional); Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.720 (Supp.
1994) (choice between lethal injection and gas); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103 (1993) (choice between
hanging and lethal injection); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.355 (Michie 1991) (lethal injection); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (Supp. 1993) (hanging if lethal injection is impractical); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2C: 49-2 (Supp.
1994) (lethal injection); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-11 (Michie 1993) (lethal injection); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-
187 (1993) (choice between gas and lethal injection); Otto REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.22 (Anderson Supp. 1993)
(choice between electrocution and lethal injection); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1014 (1992) (electrocution if lethal
injection is unconstitutional, firing squad if electrocution is unconstitutional); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.473 (Supp.
1994) (lethal injection); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2121.1 (1993) (lethal injection): S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-27A-32 (1993) (lethal injection); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14 (West Supp. 1994) (lethal
injection); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5 (1993) (choice between lethal injection and firing squad); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180 (1990) (choice between hanging and lethal injection); WYO. STAT. § 7-13-904
(1993) (gas if lethal injection is unconstitutional).
254. Eleven states use electrocution exclusively. See ALA. CODE § 15-18-82 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 922.10 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-38 (1993); IND. CODE § 35-38-6-1 (1992); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 431.220 (Baldwin 1993); MASS. GEN. L ch. 279, § 60 (Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2532
(1992); N.Y. CORRECr. LAW § 662 (McKinney 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24030530 (Law. Co-op. 1993);TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-23-114 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-1-233 (Michie 1993). As previously mentioned, Ohio
provides for a choice between electrocution and lethal injection, and Louisiana uses only electrocution on
persons sentenced before September 15, 1992. Supra note 253.
255. Four states (California, Arizona, North Carolina and Missouri) provide that the defendant may
choose between another method and gas. See supra note 253. Further, both Mississippi and Wyoming retain
gas as an alternative method should lethal injection be found unconstitutional. Id.
256. See supra note 6 (describing the state death penalty statutes which include hanging as a means of
execution).
257. While Utah is the only state to offer a choice between the firing squad and another method, both
Idaho and Oklahoma retain shooting as an alternative method of execution. See supra note 253.
258. Gardner. supra note 77, at 125-27 n.228 (noting that both Oklahoma and Texas adopted lethal
injection as a more humane substitute for the electric chair, and also noting that electrocution is painful, causes
disfigurement and is not altogether reliable); Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1039 (taking the stance that
electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment).
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hanging.59 This decision comes closely on the heels of the decision of the
Arizona Legislature to switch from the gas chamber to a choice between gas and
lethal injection, after a prisoner executed by gas took ten agonizing minutes to
die, all the while gasping, shuddering and making obscene gestures to the
witnesses with his strapped-down hands.2" In fact, the only method which
appears not to have been subjected to criticism is the most favored method of
lethal injection.26
It can thus hardly be said that society favors hanging as a modem method of
262 ouexecution. Yet four states continue to carry hanging on their books.
Interestingly, Washington appears to be the only state which has used hanging in
over fifty years.263 Why hanging remains a viable method in light of a standard
that looks to the contemporary norms of society is certainly a puzzle. The fact that
only four states retain hanging also shows that, as in Weems, 264 it should no
longer be a valid method of execution. These four states need to adapt to con-
temporary norms and reject hanging as the majority of society has.
The fact that there is a very real lack of qualified and experienced hangmen
also indicates that hanging does not comport with contemporary norms. In 1984,
then-Representative Daniel A. Eaton pointed to the lack of qualified hangmen
when arguing to replace hanging with lethal injection in New Hampshire?65 In
1987, as Delaware prepared for the hanging of Billie Bailey, it erected a new
gallows and hired an executioner, "a Canadian backwoodsman who could only
be contacted through notes left on a tree stump by the local mounties."26 This
argument was also heard in 1981 by the Washington Supreme Court in the
259. See Fierro v. Gomez, No. C92-1482 MHP, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14304 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 1994)
(holding use of gas chamber unconstitutional); Fierro v. Gomcz, 790 F. Supp. 966, 971 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(comparing death by hanging to death by lethal gas).
260. Gruesome Death in Gas Chamber Pushes Arizona Toward Injections, N.Y. TIES, Apr. 25, 1992,
at 9.
261. See Mark Curriden. Lethal hijection Now a Preferred Method, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 24,
1991, at C4 (reporting that many states have recently adopted lethal injection because of rising criticism of both
electrocution and the gas chamber).
262. There has not been a judicial hanging in any English-speaking country since 1966, with the
exceptions of the hangings of Westley Allan Dodd and Charles Campbell, other than in South Africa and some
smaller states in the Caribbean. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 700 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1994) (Reinhardt, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied. 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
263. New Hampshire has not conducted a hanging since 1939. Amy Miller, Lethal Injection May
Replace Hanging, UPI. July 17, 1984. available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
264. 217 U.S. 349 (1909). In determining that the Philippine Islands' statute was cruel and unusual, the
Court in Weems considered the fact that there were no laws in the United States similar to the Philippine
statute. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
265. Miller, supra note 263.
266. Kurt Heine, In Delaware, Killers Face Needle or Noose, Ctit. TmI., Aug. 18, 1991, at C4.
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Frampton case.267 Other than the persons who recently hung Mr. Dodd and Mr.
Campbell, it is unlikely that any trained hangmen exist in the United States.2
4. Dignity of Society and the Prisoner
Related to the issue of contemporary norms is the idea of dignity of both
society and the prisoner. This concept was demonstrated in Weems when the
Court held that it was cruel and unusual for the Philippine Islands to sentence a
person so harshly as to take away the prisoner's dignity 69 Implicit in that con-
cept is the idea that when the government acts in such a cruel manner, it is
harming society by creating a framework for tyranny. In other words, it is setting
a precedent for invoking laws in the future that will also treat prisoners harshly.
By refusing to allow such cruel punishments, the dignity of society is also
preserved, and society itself becomes more humane and more conscious of the
dignity of prisoners.
One only needs to look at changes that have occurred with regard to
prisoners' rights in the last twenty years to see the increased consideration given
to the dignity of prisoners, and society itself, by legislators and the courts. For
instance, suits by prisoners abound, declaring that their civil rights have been
infringed during the arrest and detention phases. Likewise, it is now considered
cruel and unusual for prisons to deny prisoners basic necessities, to force them to
eat certain foods, to subject them to cramped or unsanitary living conditions or
harsh noise levels, and even to deny them access to law libraries.2 70
Because we recognize the dignity of individual prisoners, hanging should be
rejected as a method of execution. By retaining hanging, prisoners receive
contradictory treatment. On the one hand, the courts and society recognize some
prisoner's rights. On the other hand, courts and society subject prisoners to a
possibly painful and undignified death by hanging. Moreover, society's own
267. Larry Roberts, UPI, Jan. 13, 1981, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
268. Although there are no reports about the identity of Dodd's or Campbell's hangmen, the state of
Washington previously faced the problem of a lack of qualified hangmen when it appeared that Campbell
would be executed in 1989. The state eventually hired an anonymous retired hangman from Topeka, Kansas,
after searching in other states and even other countries, according to Richard Bauer, spokesman for the
Washington state penitentiary. Ann Japenga, Mystery Hangman Sets Off A Washington Controversy, L.A.
TMES, Apr. 12, 1989, at View I. The hangman, aged 74, knew of only one other experienced hangman in the
country, and expressed doubt that others existed. Id. Further, it was unknown whether the other qualified
hangman, the person from whom Campbell's hangman learned his trade at a prison for war crimes near Tokyo
after World War II, was still alive. Id. The anonymous hangman claimed to be responsible for 64 previous
hangings. Id.
269. 217 U.S. 349 (1909); see supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Jae v. Boyer, 977 F.2d 568 (3rd Cir. 1992) (holding, in an unpublished opinion, that the
allegation that a prisoner was denied access to law library should not have been dismissed as frivolous);
Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding an Eighth Amendment prohibition
against certain harsh prison conditions); Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(discussing Eighth Amendment protections against deprivations of basic necessities such as toiletries, among
others).
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dignity also dictates that hanging be abolished. By retaining an archaic and bar-
baric method of execution, the United States will become known as a backward
and barbaric country that still hangs prisoners who commit crimes. Consider
one's own view of other cultures that chop off the hand or finger of someone
caught stealing. Most people in the United States would consider that cruel, and
think that the country which practices that method of punishment is barbaric as
well. Hanging in the 1990s similarly reflects on the dignity of our society.
B. The Argument
While the Ninth Circuit has recently determined that hanging is not cruel and
unusual,"7 the evidence presented above strongly suggests that hanging would be
found unconstitutional if the United States Supreme Court was actually to decide
this issue. Hanging is unconstitutional because it does not meet the four standards
for assessing cruel and unusual punishments under the Eighth Amendment.
Further, when the arguments in favor of hanging are weighed against the
arguments opposing hanging, the balance tips in favor of abolition.
The standards of the Eighth Amendment were developed because courts were
concerned about humanity. While the courts recognized the need for punishment,
to send a message to the criminal as well as to society, they also recognized that
our society has certain notions about dignity and humanity; it is not ethical to
subject anyone to torture or needless suffering. Kemmler, Weems, Trop and all of
the other cases from which the definition of cruel and unusual punishment
originated, teach us that man, no matter what crime he has committed, has a right
to be punished in a manner that is as humane as possible.272 The definition of
humane is to be decided by the current standards of society.
Hanging cannot be constitutional under the Eighth Amendment in 1994
because the notion of hanging as humane was discarded when the electric chair
first came into use.273 For over a century, our society has considered hanging in-
humane and barbaric.274 When one considers that lethal injection is the most
widely accepted and probably the least objectionable method of execution, the
contemporary norms of society strongly suggest that hanging should not be
retained.
Nor should hanging be retained as a choice among methods of execution.
Retaining hanging as an option does not preclude other states in the future from
adopting hanging as their sole method of execution. More importantly, since
271. See infra notes 298-322 and accompanying text (discussing Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th
Cir. Feb. 8, 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994)) and why it is in error).
272. See supra notes 88-113 and accompanying text (discussing Keunnier, Weens and Trop).
273. See supra note 251 (describing several instances in which states chose alternative methods of
execution because they were believed to be more humane than hanging).
274. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (discussing the 1890 case of Kemmler, which
described hanging as a barbarous means of execution),
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hanging violates all of the factors currently required under Eighth Amendment
analysis, in reality, the prisoner is not given a choice among constitutional
alternatives at all. The "choice" only serves as a vehicle to ease legislators',
jurists' and society's minds. If a prisoner chooses his method of execution, then
it can be rationalized that no cruel and unusual punishment has been imposed.
Because there is no real choice for the prisoner, however, states should impose
only one method, such as lethal injection, and face the consequences of making
the choice for the prisoner. By having to face the consequences, it is less likely
that controversial methods of execution, such as hanging or even shooting, would
be imposed.
Furthermore, there is conflicting evidence that hanging is painless and that
death is instantaneous. 27 But should hanging be retained because of a possibility
that it is not always painful? There is no real way of knowing if hanging is pain-
less or if there will be more bungling in the future. Experience, however, teaches
us that there is a probability that bunglings and painful deaths by strangulation or
mutilation will occur. A court weighing such possibilities should take a con-
servative approach and rule hanging unconstitutional because the chance of pain-
ful death exists. Further, that lethal injection provides a method that is virtually
pain-free and "bungle-proof"2 76is another factor a court should weigh when
considering the pain hanging might inflict. Comparing lethal injection, a pre-
dictable method of execution, with hanging and the unknown consequences it can
produce, moves the balance in favor of hanging's abolition.
Finally, abolishing hanging is consistent with the letter and intent of the
Eighth Amendment because it retains the dignity of prisoners as well as society.
The punishment of death is painful enough for the prisoner. We must not create
added stress and pain for the prisoner by subjecting him to a painful and humil-
iating method of execution. The Weems Court intended to prevent degrading
punishments when it declared the punishment of fifteen years' imprisonment
cruel and unusual for the crime of merely falsifying a public document. 7
Although capital crimes are much more heinous than the crime committed in
Weems, a civilized society does not impose punishments that violate a prisoner's
dignity.
Not only must we consider the dignity of the prisoner, but we must consider
the dignity of society as well. Hanging should not be retained simply as a means
of deterrence; indeed, it goes against the very dignity of society to retain a
barbaric and potentially torturous form of punishment simply to deter others from
committing crimes. Making our system of justice more cruel is not an answer to
the escalating violent crime problem in the United States. We must find other
275. See supra notes 204-234 and accompanying text (discussing the physical pain involved in hanging).
276. See supra notes 217-234 and accompanying text (describing "bungling").
277. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text (discussing Weems).
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solutions than simply imposing cruel and outdated modes of execution. Harsher
penalties are one thing, but cruel penalties are another.
C. The Ninth Ciruit's Flawed Reasoning and Other Reasons to Retain
Hanging
Probably the foremost argument against abolishing hanging is that it simply
is a nonissue. Opponents would argue that because hanging is presented as a
choice among methods of execution, and it is not summarily imposed upon those
about to be executed, then there is no reason to discuss it. People are free to
choose the alternate method, and thus hanging need not even be considered.
As was demonstrated in Rupe 278 and DeShield, 279 this approach has several
flaws. It permits the courts to completely avoid the very real issues that need to
be addressed, such as the potential pain inflicted on the person being hanged and
the lack of fit with contemporary norms. Society, as well as judges, should not
avoid the difficult questions by hiding behind this excuse. 0 Would the same
argument be made if states gave a choice between lethal injection and burning at
the stake? While a choice still exists, it is doubtful people would be content to sit
back and let a "death by fire" statute remain on the books.
Second, as was previously explained, a prisoner really does not have a choice
at all. This is evidenced by the fact that there have been no hangings until
recently, yet in both Montana and Washington, the choice of death by hanging
has been available.28' Even the legislatures of the states that retain hanging con-
cede that there is no real choice. For instance, New Hampshire added lethal
injection to its books because, when hanging was the only method of execution,
juries were reluctant to impose the death penalty on prisoners, believing it was too
cruel.282 The choice between hanging and lethal injection was added in Montana
based, in part, on the efforts of Senator Bob Brown, who deemed hanging
inhumane and possibly even unconstitutional.283 Montana Assistant State
278. See supra notes 167-174 and accompanying text (discussing Rupe).
279. See supra notes 175-186 and accompanying text (discussing DeShields).
280. Interestingly, although state cases exist for the proposition that a method of execution cannot be
challenged because prisoners are given the choice of an alternate method, prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1992). where the court decided not to hear Campbell's
arguments against hanging because he had a choice in the matter, there were no federal court cases standing
for such a proposition. Barbieri, supra note 53, at 4.
281. Campbell refused to make a choice, Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 681 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994) and thus hanging was mandated by Washington's death penalty statute. See
supra note 6 (describing the Washington state death penalty statute, among others). It should be noted that in
Montana, where prisoners have a choice between hanging and lethal injection, see supra note 6, there has not
been a hanging since the state hung Philip "Slim" Coleman on September 10, 1943. Peter Fox, REUTERS
NORTH EUROPEAN SERVICE, Feb. 21, 1983. available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
282. Bob Hohler, Not Carried Outfor 50 Years; As Recently Revised, N.H. Death Penalty More Apt to
be Used: Eaecution Stirs Debate, NEw HAMPSIHIRE WEEKLY, July 9, 1989, at 1.
283. Fox, supra note 281.
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Attorney General John Maynard also backed Brown's proposal, indicating that
the United States Supreme Court might rule hanging unconstitutional.m Lethal
injection was added to Washington's statute because legislators thought the
Washington Supreme Court would find hanging to be cruel and unusual.8 5 This
sentiment was proven wrong, however, by the decision in Frampton.86 Finally,
before Delaware changed to lethal injection, supporters of the change called
hanging "brutal" and reasoned that juries would be more willing to impose the
death penalty if it were carried out by lethal injection0
7
Third, problems occur when the prisoner refuses to choose. For instance, she
may have an objection to participating in her own death in any manner, possibly
for religious reasons, and that includes choosing the means of execution. Hanging
may be chosen for her. Under the Montana and Washington statutes, this
possibility exists. 8 For instance, Campbell was hung because he refused to
choose between hanging and lethal injection and thus, under the Washington
statute, hanging was chosen for him.29 In Montana, the choice of lethal injection
is waived if not asserted when the date for execution is set.2 ' Delaware also faces
this problem because its current statute,29' which imposes lethal injection, gives
people who were sentenced to die by hanging under its prior statute2 the choice
between hanging or lethal injection.29a For people sentenced before 1986 who
refuse to choose, however, hanging is still imposed.294 Finally, it is possible that
hanging could even be imposed in New Hampshire, which uses lethal injection
as its primary method, because the statute gives the commissioner the discretion
to impose hanging should he find it is impractical to carry out lethal injection for
284. Id.
285. Robert McDaniel, UPI, Apr.16, 1981, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
286. 627 P.2d 922 (Wash. 1981).
287. UPI, May 15, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (quoting Rep. Roger Roy and
Sen. Thomas Sharp).
288. See supra note 6 (describing the Montana and Washington death penalty statutes).
289. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 681 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994); see
supra note 6 (describing the Washington statute).
290. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(3) (1993).
291. DE. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(f) (1993) (retaining hanging only if lethal injection is found
unconstitutional).
292. Id. § 4209(0 (1979).
293. The act states that "any person sentenced to death for acts committed prior to the enactment of this
act shall be permitted to elect lethal injection, as provided herein, as the method of death." DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11 § 4209(f) (1986). This statute was enacted on June 13, 1986.
294. Heine, supra note 266, at C4 (discussing the dilemma of death row inmate James W. Riley, who
refused to choose between lethal injection and hanging). The court in DeShields also noted that hanging would
be imposed on Mr. DeShields because he was sentenced to die prior to the new statute, and because he refused
to exercise his choice between methods of execution. DeShields v. Delaware, 534 A.2d 630, 639 (Del. 1987);
see supra notes 175-186 (describing DeShields).
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 26
any reason. 295 Since the statute does not define "impractical," there appear to be
no limits on the commissioner's power to choose.
Given the overwhelming evidence that hanging is cruel and unusual, to
impose hanging on people who exercise a right not to choose is tantamount to
punishing them for not making the choice. For instance, the Delaware court
stated, "DeShields can avoid hanging and any unnecessary pain and degradation
which he suggests hanging entails by choosing lethal injection."2% However, pri-
soners who have a valid objection to choosing (and who are not merely refusing
to choose in the hopes that the method imposed will be deemed unconstitutional)
should not be forced to act against their beliefs by the threat that hanging, a
painful and demeaning method of execution, will be imposed if they do not
choose. By imposing hanging in this situation, the state seizes all of the prisoner's
rights: the right to die as painlessly as possible, and the freedom to choose - or not
to choose.297
Even when a prisoner chooses hanging, it does not mean that he had access
to information that enabled him to make an informed decision. Many people
might blindly accept that hanging has been perfected since it is currently being
used and has not been ruled unconstitutional. Even if they choose hanging
believing it to be a dignified manner of execution, they may be ignorant of the
controversy surrounding the pain inflicted by hanging. A state cannot escape the
consequences of its laws by reasoning that it was the prisoner's choice, where it
allows uninformed persons to choose hanging in the midst of this controversy.
Instead of this "conscious ignorance" approach, the state has an obligation to
either change its laws, or inform prisoners of the risks associated with hanging.
Proponents of execution by hanging point to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Campbell v. Wood 29 as evidence that hanging survives constitutional scrutiny.
The obvious flaw in this argument is that hanging has not yet received
constitutional scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court, nor does such
scrutiny appear likely, since the Court denied Campbell's petition for certiorari.299
295. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (Xil, XIV) (Supp. 1993). The statute states:
[T]he commissioner of corrections or his designee shall determine the substance or
substances to be used and the procedure to be used in any execution, provided, however,
that if for any reason the commissioner finds it to be impractical to carry out the
punishment of death by administration of the required lethal substance or substances,
the sentence of death may be carried out by hanging under the provisions of law for the
death penalty by h.anging in effect on December 31, 1986.
296. DeShields, 534 A.2d at 639.
297. Apparently some people recognize that imposing hanging as the default method has constitutional
problems. Washington Attorney General Christine Gregoire recently introduced a proposal to the Legislature
that lethal injection be the default method when prisoners refuse to choose, and to allow prisoners to choose
hanging if they desire. A Very Sensible Solution In Debate Over Hanging, SEATrLETIMES, July 19, 1994, at
B4.
298. 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
299. Campbell v. Wood, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
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As discussed below, the Ninth Circuit's decision is faulty for many reasons.
However, by declining to review hanging, not only does the Court permit
Washington and Montana to continue to inflict a cruel punishment on prisoners,
it permits all states to do so, since hanging remains a viable option for any state.
In these times when crime is a national problem, a barbaric yet constitutional
punishment like hanging is attractive to those seeking solutions to the problem.
The Supreme Court's "green light," coupled with the fact that the recent hangings
appeared to proceed rather smoothly, may be the impetus needed for other states
to adopt hanging.
Had the Court actually reviewed the Ninth Circuit's decision that hanging is
constitutional, it is doubtful that it would have survived constitutional scrutiny.
The Ninth Circuit first stated that it was operating under the presumption that
Washington's statute was valid.3°° Relying heavily on United States District
Judge John J. Coughenour's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court
determined that hanging did not involve any wanton or unnecessary infliction of
pain, and as such, was constitutional.3"' The fact that Judge Coughenour did not
allow any evidence of bungling in the evidentiary hearing was not error,
according to the court, because such evidence was not relevant to Washington's
hanging procedures. °2 Further, the fact that no evidence regarding lethal injection
was allowed by Judge Coughenour also was not error, as the only method at issue
was hanging and whether it was unnecessarily painful.30 3
However, the court's reliance on Judge Coughenour's determinations, as well
as its own reasoning, were defective. First, Judge Coughenour's findings of fact
and conclusions of law are questionable.3" In determining that hanging was
constitutional under Washington's protocol, Judge Coughenour only concentrated
on the possibility of decapitation and pain resulting from a hanging, and did not
consider the possibility of strangulation. Thus, Judge Coughenour began with the
finding that Washington's protocol was virtually accident-proof. 5 He found that
hanging could have several consequences, such as cardiac arrest, irreversible
brain damage, trauma to the brain stem, occlusion of the airway, and laceration
of the spinal cord, among others. 3 6 He concluded that all of these consequences
would result in either immediate or near immediate death or unconsciousness,
without defining the term "immediate."30 7 He also concluded that cervical
300. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d at 675 (9th Cir. 1994).
301. Id. at 683.
302. Id. at 679.
303. Id. at 687.
304. Judge Coughenour's determinations are contained in an unpublished opinion; see Campbell v.
Blodgett, No. C89-456C (W.D. Wash. June 1, 1993) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
305. Id. at 3, 11 7-9. As the dissent in Campbell v Wood points out, the protocol relied upon by
Washington was derived from the U.S. Army. Ironically, however, the U.S. Army abandoned the use of
hanging as a method of execution in 1986. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d at 697-98 (Reinhardt, C.J., dissenting).
306. Campbell v. Blodgett, slip op. at 3-4,Il 10.
307. Id. at 4, 1111-12.
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fracture, which occurs in a sizeable minority of the cases, was not required in
order to produce immediate or near immediate unconsciousness or death.3"
Given, however, that cervical fracture. is the ideal consequence of judicial
hanging, Judge Coughenour's conclusion is questionable considering his
concession that it only happens in a minority of cases.
Judge Coughenour hardly discussed the evidence presented by Campbell,
other than to state that Campbell did not present convincing evidence that hanging
would result in decapitation or that death would not be almost immediate. Judge
Coughenour noted that he had excluded much of Campbell's evidence regarding
bungling due to admissibility problems, but that his findings would be the same
even if it were admitted.3° Again, given the above accounts of bungling,3"' and
the fact that many bunglings occurred even after the introduction of the "long
drop" technique which was supposed to revolutionize hanging, 1 Judge
Coughenour's conclusion that the evidence of bungling did not matter is also
debatable.3 2 Interestingly, Judge Coughenour also includes Westley Allan
Dodd's hanging in his findings of fact, although he does not mention the fact that
Dodd's neck was not broken:3 t3 "The execution of Westley Allan Dodd resulted
in death without decapitation or significant mutilation.31 4 However, this finding
gives little support to his conclusion that hanging is not cruel and unusual because
he ignores the fact that Dodd's neck was not broken, and he does not address how
much mutilation is necessary before hanging would be considered cruel.
Not only are Judge Coughenour's determinations disputable, but the Ninth
Circuit relied on them almost exclusively without doing a proper Eighth
Amendment analysis.315 The court did not consider any factors such as the
contemporary norms of society, psychological pain, or the dignity of the prisoner
and society. As the dissent and this article point out, one cannot properly
conclude that hanging is constitutional without considering factors others than the
possibility of physical pain. The court noted Campbell's argument that the
scarcity of states using hanging should be considered in making this
determination. The court, however, dismissed this argument by stating that the
real issue is the pain involved in the challenged method. "The number of states
308. Id. at 5, 13.
309. Id. at 6, 122.
310. See supra notes 217-234 and accompanying text (describing bungling).
311. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (describing the long drop technique).
312. The importance of this evidence cannot be understated. There was simply no other evidence
available to Campbell to demonstrate the effects of hanging other than the evidence from Dodd's hanging.
However, since that was the only hanging to occur in recent years, it was not exactly fair for Judge Coughenour
to rely solely on this evidence.
313. Judge Coughenour also relied on the evidence presented by the medical examiner regarding Dodd's
hanging. Campbell v. Blodgett, slip op. at 5-6, 120.
314. Id. at 7, 129 (emphasis added).
315. A full discussion of the Ninth Circuit's decision is beyond the scope of this article. However, Judge
Reinhardt's dissent provides an excellent critique of the majority analysis. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d at
692-729 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
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using hanging is evidence of public perception, but sheds no light on the actual
pain that may or may not attend the practice. We cannot conclude that judicial
hanging is incompatible with evolving standards of decency simply because few
states continue the practice."316 Incredibly, the court made this determination
despite the prevailing notion that Eighth Amendment analysis should be
conducted under "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."3 7
The court discussed Washington's hanging procedures, as well as Judge
Coughenour's determinations. It stated, "Although there is no way to predict with
a high degree of accuracy which of the various mechanisms will contribute to
unconsciousness and death in any given hanging, there are methods of increasing
the likelihood that unconsciousness will be rapid and death comparatively
painless."3 The court noted that one of these methods was the introduction of the
long drop. As previously stated, however, this method does not ensure instan-
taneous death or unconsciousness.31 9 The fact that the court relied on this
evidence, yet failed to see any error by Judge Coughenour in disallowing
evidence regarding bunglings, suggests that the court made its decision while
wearing blinders. Further, the court also considered the success of Dodd's
hanging, and the fact that Washington has now carried out one judicial hanging
under its protocol.32° Ignoring the fact that Dodd's death did not occur as
intended, the court focused on the fact that the medical examiner concluded Dodd
was most likely unconscious in a matter of seconds.32' Apparently, the court was
so determined to use Dodd's hanging as evidence of the success of the protocol
that it failed to realize the irony of relying on the only judicial hanging which had
ever been conducted under Washington's protocol.
Finally, the court's holding that Judge Coughenour's evidentiary rulings were
not in error also begs the question. Not only is evidence of bunglings relevant to
this issue because it demonstrates the possibility of pain experienced by the
prisoner, but evidence of lethal injection should also have been considered
because it is a relevant comparison to determine if hanging is truly humane and
not unnecessarily painful.322 In the end, the court found that hanging was not
316. Id. at 682.
317. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,101 (1958); see supra notes 108-113 (discussing Trop).
318. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d at 684.
319. See supra notes 204-219 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in attempting to assure
"instantaneous" death or unconsciousness).
320. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d at 683, 685.
321. Id. at 685.
322. See id. at 715 (Reinhardt, C.i., dissenting) (noting that by preventing Campbell's presentation of
evidence regarding lethal injection, the district court "precluded him from showing that the pain associate with
haging is unnecessary to the termination of human life"). Quoting Justice Powell's dissent in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 430 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[N]o court would approve any method of
implementaiton of the death sentence found to involve unnecessary cruelty in light of presently available
alternatives"), Reinhardt remarked: "Justice Powell would surely have been surprised at the district court's
rulings .. .. He would have been even more astonished by the majority's cursory and unexplained
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painful, based on evidence which was severely limited and flawed, and then used
that finding as the sole basis for its decision. The court's holding, however, is
clearly faulty because it is not predicated on an adequate Eighth Amendment
analysis.
Other potential arguments in favor of retaining hanging have little merit when
compared to the evidence that hanging is unconstitutional. Opponents auto-
matically state that there are problems with all methods; electrocution and the gas
chamber immediately come to mind. However, this article does not attempt to
weigh the differences between hanging and other methods, other than to point out
that almost all other methods except lethal injection are undergoing criticism. The
key is to keep in mind the standards of the Eighth Amendment. The purpose of
the Eighth Amendment is to give our society dignity, and ensure that prisoners
die as dignified and as painless a death as possible. In light of evidence that
hanging may be horribly painful, that death is not always instantaneous, that
contemporary norms do not support hanging, and that lethal injection is a much
cheaper and painless solution, it does not matter how hanging compares to
electrocution or gas. What matters is how hanging survives Eighth Amendment
analysis. Nor should hanging be retained in response to the argument that
abolishing hanging is simply another route to abolishing the death penalty. If
these types of arguments are seriously considered, then no change will ever be
accomplished.
Proponents of hanging may argue that because society is becoming more
violent, we need harsher punishments to deter potential criminals. This argument
also has little validity. It does not consider the factors used by the courts in
assessing whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. While it is fine to want
harsher penalties for crimes, the rights of prisoners cannot be ignored. If we allow
punishments with constitutional implications to exist, our system of justice
becomes no better than those in societies where prisoners' rights are routinely
violated. For both the dignity of society and the prisoner, hanging should be
abolished.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the notion that hanging is a "popular form of vigilante justice, 323 the
state of Washington has hanged two people in the last two years, and three other
states retain the ability to execute by hanging. This article attempts to demonstrate
why hanging is not constitutional under the Eighth Amendment and should be
abolished. In essence, hanging is a cruel and unusual punishment because it
violates the four elements courts must consider when doing a proper Eighth
endorsement of them." Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d at 715 (Reinhardt, C.J. dissenting).
323. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 642.493 P.2d 880, 889, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 161 (1972).
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Amendment analysis: physical pain, psychological pain, dignity of the prisoner
and society, and contemporary norms of society.
To date, no court has properly reviewed hanging to determine if it is
constitutional. The recent decision by the Ninth Circuit was based on flawed
reasoning.324 That court simply failed to consider all of the factors necessary to
make a proper determination, and the evidence it did consider was incomplete.
Other courts have managed to avoid the issue by stating that it is a job for the
legislature,3" or that the choice between hanging and another method renders the
challenge moot.326 However, until a court gives hanging the consideration it
deserves, it is likely that a few states will continue to send people to their deaths
by a trip to the gallows, thereby violating constitutional rights in the process.
324. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994); see supra
notes 298-322 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Campbell v. Wood).
325. See supra note 129 (discussing several state court decisions which defer to the legislatures on the
issue of hanging).
326. See supra notes 62-63, 178, 194, 198-200 and accompanying text (describing instances in which
courts have found that the availability of a choice between hanging and another method of execution renders
moot a challenge to the constitutionality of hanging).
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